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The Department of the Navy recently acquired eighteen
auxiliary ships, five T-5 tankers and thirteen TAKX cargo
carriers. The financing of these ships was not carried out
via the standard purchase appropriation but rather through
a complex transaction, known as a leveraged lease. The tax
benefits contained in the Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA)
of 1981 permit either public or private entities to share
tax benefits with the owner of an asset. Leveraged leasing
is based on this principle. The tax benefits received by a
public tax exempt entity is a loss to the Federal Treasury
and Congress has reacted with legislation to control it.
This study examines leveraged leasing in the private and
public sector with special emphasis on the lease by the
Navy of the thirteen Maritime Preposi tioning Ships (TAKX).
The complex sequence of cash and tax flows are discussed as
well as the impact on the federal budgeting process and
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The Department of the Navy is currently involved in a
unique lease transaction to gain the services of two new
types of auxiliary ships, namely the T-5 tanker and the
Maritime Prepositioning Ship (TAKX) cargo carrier. The
vessels are to be leased from the civilian sector, and to
be manned by civilian personnel.
The program began in response to a requirement to
provide ships to support the prepositioning of bulk cargo
for the Rapid Deployment Force. The budget initiatives to
buy the ships were not successful as Congress placed a
higher priority on other programs and eliminated
procurement funds from the defense budget in Fiscal Year
(FY) 1981. A recommendation at the time was for the Navy
to continue to pursue "pr ivi ti zation" by reducing
competition with commercially available resources and to
turn to the Merchant Marine to provide the necessary hulls.
The Navy submitted, in FY 82, a plan, approved by the
Secretary of Defense and Office of Management and Budget to
rely on the Merchant Marine by chartering the TAKX and T-5
vessels
.
The TAKX and T-5 build (or convert) and charter program




The Navy has executed binding contracts for all
thirteen (13) TAKX ships with General Dynamics (who will
build five), Waterman Steamship Corporation (who will
convert three ships) and Maersk Lines Ltd. (who will
convert five ships) for a total capitalized cost of $2.3
billion. Ships are under construction in four shipyards,
$2.2 billion in revolving credit has been arranged with
four bank syndicates and hundreds of millions of dollars of
orders for steel, equipment components, and other material
have been let to meet the construction/conversion schedule.
Two of the ships to be converted have already been cut in
half in preparation for mid-body sections.
The Navy has also entered into building contracts with
Ocean Carriers Inc. to build and charter five T-5 type
tankers costing $330 million. Construction has also begun
on this contract.
Despite Congressional approval received for TAKX and
T-5 and the more than fifty U.S. flag vessels already under
charter, the TAKX and T-5 transactions have caused a great
amount of controversy. Most of the concern centers around
the particular type of lease used by the Navy to procure
the services of the thirteen TAKX vessels and the five T-5
tankers. It is known as a leveraged lease.
A leveraged lease uses tax benefits available from the
Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) of 1981 together with
lease rental payments to provide an investor with a
10

satisfactory rate of return. Some find this use of tax
incentives objectionable and their concerns will be
discussed. However, it should be noted that the Navy has
not undertaken the TAKX program because tax "loopholes"
were suddenly available to those who participate in the
lease markets. The Navy has been trying to purchase a
cargo carrier like TAKX for over twenty years.
In 1960 the House Armed Services Committee held
extensive hearings on military airlift and sealift
capabilities and devised an interim solution to the obvious
lack of ships and planes to support the national defense
plans
.
The Foward Floating Deployed (FFD) ships, which were
rehabilitated Victory ships, provided some of the needed
lift capacity particularly for outsized equipment and three
were programmed for FY 1963. Longer term solutions were
proposed by Congressional and DOD study groups which
recommended a combination of airlift and sealift provided
primarily by the C-5A aircraft and a new Fast Deployment
Logistic (FDL) ship. The FDL ship has been an operational
requirement since the early 1960's and was envisioned
together with the C-5A as a flexible logistic support
system capable of operating from CONUS bases or as forward
deployed units. The C-5A was funded but not the FDL. To
provide the required sealift capability the Navy has leased




1. Leveraged Lease Transaction
A leveraged lease is designed to provide benefits
to both the lessor and the lessee by essentially sharing
the tax benefits available to the owner/lessor. The
structure of a leveraged lease allows the owner of an asset
to take tax benefits based on the full value of the asset
with an investment of as little as twenty percent of the
purchase price. A lender provides the balance of funds.
The enormous tax benefits of ownership are, therefore,
leveraged with a limited investment and the company in need
of an asset has use of it at a rental fee which can be
reduced to reflect the tax benefits received by the owner.
An analysis of a leveraged lease is complex due to
the different perspectives from which the participants view
the transaction. It is also difficult to evaluate because
of the unique pattern and timing of the cash flows which
include not only direct receipts and expenditures by the
participants but also the incidence of taxes due to the
Federal Government. The TAKX and T-5 programs are
especially interesting because the lease under which they
are acquired includes the Federal Government as a
participant and therefore further complicates the structure
of the lease and the pattern of cash flows.
This thesis examines the structure and cash flows
of a leveraged lease in which the Federal Government is the
charterer/user of a capital asset. There are specific
12

issues related to the structure and cash flows that are of
concern, especially the unresolved issue of the total cost
of the program. These issues will be discussed at length.
2 . Leasing in the Navy
Leasing auxiliary shipping to increase bulk cargo
tonnage available for the transfer of both men and material
is not new. Congress approved the lease of thirty ships
under a Build and Charter program starting in 1952. The
Navy leased nine ships in 1973 under a Build and Charter
arrangement which had many of the financial characteristics
of TAKX and T-5. Military Sealift Command charters
commercial ships on a regular basis and currently has more
than 50 under some form of lease arrangement. But, unlike
the routine chartering of space implied in most leases, the
T-5 and TAKX and the 1973 Build and Charter program are
multi-ship acquisitions with potentially lifetime contracts
that involve the Federal Government in almost all aspects
of the ship's operation and financing. With such total
involvement in the asset, many want to know why the Navy
decided to lease rather than buy. In many minds, T-5 and
TAKX financing through this unique type of lease is
actually a disguised purchase.
The Navy presents expert opinion that shows leasing
the TAKX and T-5 ships will cost less than purchase by a
significant amount, 16.1%. The Joint Committee on Taxation
and the General Accounting Office analyzed the same data
13

and predicted the lease alternative would be more expensive
than purchase by 11.7%. The almost $50 million difference
per ship between the two groups stems from different
theories of the effect TAKX and T-5 will have in the debt
markets and on the cash flows and reflows that are a part
of a leveraged lease.
3 . Congressional Concern
The structure of the lease for the TAKX and T-5 has
stirred a debate within Congress and the Department of
Defense. The lease relies on tax benefits to reduce the
direct cost to the Navy. Critics argue that those same tax
benefits were intended for the private sector to encourage
capital investment, not to subsidize expenditures of the
Navy's appropriated funds.
When a federal agency becomes a party to a
leveraged lease transaction it is argued by the Joint
Committee on Taxation and Government Accounting Office that
the Treasury Department in effect subsidizes the
transaction via a negative tax flow. In other words, the
tax savings advantage the leveraged lease gives the vessel
owner reduces the amount the federal agency must pay
directly, but may increase the total cost to the government
due to lost tax revenue. Consequently, the negative tax
flow must be properly measured and assigned as a cost of
the transaction. if this measurement were possible, then a
simple cost benefit analysis comparing a leveraged lease to
14

a direct purchase would be feasible. This negative tax
flow amount could be assigned to the appropriate agency's
budget proposal enhancing the scope of Congressional
oversight in the matter. Addressing this issue in Senate
testimony a spokesman for the Department of the Treasury
said
:
"The allowance of tax incentives on assets leased to
the Federal government, per se , has no real budget
impact, provided the lease is properly accounted for in
the budget process." [Ref. 1]
Additionally, state and local governments have
started to use a leveraged lease to raise much needed
capital. They sell their real property to investors who
then lease it back via a leveraged lease transaction at
effective rates of interest below tax-exempt bonds. In
essence the non-profit entity obtains cash while the
private investors can depreciate the property and obtain
investment tax credits and other tax benefits. The costs
are borne by the federal government in reduced tax revenue.
Additionally, these tax reflows are not accounted for in
the Federal budget and, therefore, the drain on Treasury
Department reserves is uncontrolled.
In effect these government institutions are selling
tax benefits (via the sale and lease-back of real property)
that they themselves cannot use, to private sector
investors who can. The investors in turn charge the
government below-market rents so the net effect is to give
15

the government financing below prevailing interest rates.
The differential is provided by the tax benefit 'passed
through 1 from the taxable entity to the non- taxable one.
This is called a Tax Exempt Leveraged Lease (TELL)
.
At the Federal level the situation becomes even
more complex because, expenditures for goods and services
are offset by tax receipts by the Treasury and a program
should be evaluated net of these amounts. To properly
evaluate the TAKX and T-5 programs values must be assigned
to the tax benefits and reflows and combined with other
known outlays. There is very basic disagreement between
the various agencies in their assumptions of which cash
flows are relevant in their analytical models. We are
interested in these differences and how they effect the
determination of the true cost of a Federally Involved Tax
Exempt Leveraged Lease (FITELL). An additional issue is
the impression in Congress that the budget oversight
process is in some ways circumvented by the characteristics
of leasing in general and leveraged leasing in particular.
B. ISSUES TO BE DISCUSSED
Our effort will be concentrated primarily in three
areas. First, a leveraged lease as it pertains to the TAKX
T-5 procurement will be explained beginning with the
structure and participants of a 'simple' lease, evolving
through a leveraged lease in the private sector, a
16

leveraged lease in the non-Federal public sector to the
current structure of the leveraged lease involving the
TAKX. Particular emphasis will be placed on the
participants, their interrelationships, and how the flows
and reflows associated with a leveraged lease evolve from
the structure of their relationship.
Second, the relevant costs and cash flows of leveraged
leases will be discussed and their many controversial
aspects presented. Documentation developed by the
consultants for the Navy and Congressional committees will
provide the basis for discussion of the financial structure
of leveraged leasing.
Efforts to develop a model within which to calculate a
precise cost of the lease and purchase alternatives proved
to be an exercise in futility because of the complexities
of the flows and reflows that potentially impact the model.
There are several extensive commercial computer models
which, in response to requested parameters, compute lease
payments, implicit interest rates, and the exact
debt-to-equity ratio that will provide the required rate of
return for an investor. Therefore, the commercial model
used to develop the lease payments will be taken as
correct, as it was by JCT and GAO. However, commercial
models do not examine other flows associated uniquely with
FITELL and it is these expected flows of payments,
revenues, and tax benefits which will be examined.
17

Third several non-financial aspects of leveraged
leasing in the federal sector will be examined, such as
Congressional oversight and efforts to control tax exempt
leveraged leasing (TELL)
.
The TAKX procurement will form the basis of the
presentation. It has been the example most often utilized
to identify the costs and cash flows associated with the
leveraged lease discussions. Additionally, a great amount
of detail of the structure and form of a leveraged lease is
available through TAKX.
Our study will concentrate on the leasing of the
thirteen TAKX vessels, any associated cash flows appearing
in the study are taken directly from leasing models used to
evaluate TAKX. The T-5 tanker lease is structurally the
same and all arguments presented for the leasing of the
TAKX are applicable to the T-5. Therefore, the TAKX lease
will serve as a surrogate for both the TAKX and T-5.
During the research and compilation phases of this
thesis it became apparent that the complexity of the
leveraged lease structure lends itself to confusion and
misinterpretation. Therefore, throughout the thesis an
effort has been made to simplify the structure and prepare
the basis for further study of this evolving phenomenon.
C. RESEARCH STRATEGY
A standard methodology was employed in the preparation
of this study. An extensive literature search was
18

conducted involving both the National Technical Information
Service (NTIS) and the Defense Logistic Studies Information
Exchange (DLSIE) to identify existing information of lease
theory and leasing programs in the private and public
sectors. Additionally, numerous interviews with professors
at NPS provided a theoretical basis to analyze the TAKX
leasing transaction.
Interviews were also conducted with participants
involved in the transaction to obtain their personal views
and insights. At these interviews or through these
contacts we collected recent studies of the leveraged lease
and actual procurement contracts. Interviews were
conducted at Military Sealift Command, including the
Contracting Officer (CDR R.L. Gustavus) and the Counsel of
Record (Lars Anderson) for the TAKX transaction. Members
of the Defense Acquisition Regulation (DAR) council, Office
of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Office of the
Comptroller of the Navy were visited. An interview was
conducted with Mr. Everett Pyatt, Assistant Secretary of
the Navy (Shipbuilding and Logistics) , who has been a
primary advocate of TAKX and leveraged leasing and
presented the program at budget and other Congressional
hearings
.
D. SPECIFIC QUESTIONS TO BE ADDRESSED




1) What is leveraged leasing, who are the participants,
and what are their relationships?
2) How is leveraged leasing applied in the federal
sector, (i.e., what is FITELL)?
3) What are the relevant costs and accompanying cash
flows associated with FITELL?
4) Does FITELL abort the Congressional oversight
process?
E. ORGANIZATION
The following chapters are organized to present leasing
in general, and leveraged leasing in particular, in a
systematic way beginning with the structure of a simple
lease, building on that to the more complex leveraged lease
and then proceeding to the pattern of cash flows that make
this transaction so unique. Chapter Two builds a leveraged
lease from a common base point to familiarize the reader
with the applicable portions of generally accepted
accounting principles, GAAP, and how they impact on the tax
aspects of a leveraged lease. Chapter Three presents a
discussion of the cash flows associated with a leveraged
lease using the TAKX procurement. Chapter Four deals with
the problems of Congressional oversight and how the
structure of a leveraged lease may distort the budget
process and what Congressional initiatives are pending to





A. THE TAKX PROGRAM
This thesis uses the Navy's current procurement of
thirteen (13) Maritime Preposi t ioning Ships (TAKX) via a
leveraged lease financing vehicle to provide the basis for
examining the costs and benefits of tax exempt entities in
using leveraged leasing to procure equipment or services.
Our discussions will involve the financing criteria and
decisions and will not address the investment decision.
The decision that established the need for the 13 TAKX
ships is beyond the scope of this thesis. Likewise, other
creative procurement or financing schemes will not be
examined
.
This chapter identifies the differences between a basic
lease and a leveraged lease in terms of structure and
accounting requirements relative to GAAP. Additionally,
the general differences between a capital acquisition via a
leveraged lease will be examined relative to a purchase.
In order to prepare a foundation for examining the
leveraged lease question in terms of the TAKX transaction,
the following background of the TAKX's mission and




The existence of the TAKX program is a natural
outgrowth of the requirements being placed upon the
Military Sealift Command (MSC) as a supporter of the Rapid
Deployment Force (RDF) team. Certain operational scenarios
require the RDF to deploy to areas without air cargo
facilities so the TAKX was developed to preposition in
forward areas the bulk material needed to support
operations for at least thirty days. It is a built to
purpose roll-on/roll-off (ro-ro) container vessel that can
be loaded and unloaded in areas without port facilities.
The 13 TAKX ships are to be chartered by the Navy and
preposi t ioned at sea near potential crisis areas to provide
swift response at the troubled site. Manned by civilian
seaman and operated by a civilian maritime carrier, the
thirteen ships have been designed to carry enough cargo for
three brigade-sized Marine air-ground forces (MAGTFS)
consisting of 46,000 Marine personnel. [Ref. 2]
The original decision to lease rather than purchase was
based on the perceived inability to obtain procurement
funds for noncombant ships. This perception was supported
by GAO. They stated in their analysis:
"We agree that monies to purchase noncombatants are
more difficult to obtain, because at various levels the
tendency has been to delete requests for funds to
purchase noncombatants." [Ref. 3]
Everett Pyatt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy,
(Shipbuilding and Logistics) in his testimony to the Senate
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Committee on Finance noted that, "the 'Build and Charter'
method, whereby new ships are built and on completion
chartered to the Navy, is not a new concept." Mr. Pyatt
went on to elaborate the policy is consistent with
Congressional policy to rely on the "U.S. Merchant Marine
to meet the majority of its (the Navy's) ocean transpor-
tation needs during both peace and war." [Ref. 4] These
two statements along with the need for auxiliary cargo
ships within the RDF succinctly identify three basic points
for TAKX's existence:
1) The need for the TAKX vessels was documented.
2) The Navy's perception that direct procurement funding
for noncombatants was not available.
3) The precedent for leasing cargo tonnage existed and
was fundable.
Essentially the plan to rely on the Merchant Marine and
charter the TAKX vessels was developed within the Navy,
approved by the Secretary of Defense and Office of
Management and Budget, then submitted to Congress as part
of the FY-82 program [Ref. 5]. Argent Group, Ltd., a
financial services company, hereafter referred to as
Argent, was selected as the 'packager' of the leveraged
lease, a position acquired via a competitive bidding
process, with final selection being made by the Department
of the Navy. Argent Group analyzed in detail both the T-5
and TAKX leases. The analysis included sensitivity
analysis of various discount factors, analysis of the
23

economic impact upon the Department of the Navy (DON) , upon
the Treasury Department and upon the entities in a combined
sense. The basic lease payment schedule was computed by
the LAS (Lease Analysis System) computer model, a
commercial package, which is extremely sensitive to the
timing of all cash flows. Argent used LAS to predict the
cash flows and rates of return to the participants. Other
analyses of the leveraged lease/purchase alternatives were
conducted and their results generally supported the Argent
study. Cooper's and Lybrand, an accounting firm, performed
one such study. The Office of Secretary of Defense also
commissioned an economic analysis prepared by the Institute
of Defense Analysis. Following a final economic analysis
by the Surveys and Investigations Staff of the House
Appropriations Committee the Navy received written
authorization and approval to proceed with the TAKX charter
program from both the Senate and House. [Ref. 4]
Concurrently the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT)
operating in support of the House Ways and Means Committee
prepared another study. This study used TAKX as a basis
for identifying the various issues that must be reviewed
with respect to leveraged leasing in the federal sector.
Subsequently, GAO also completed a study of the TAKX
transaction and supported the Joint Committee on Taxation
concluding that although the lease was very advan-
tageous to the Navy, overall leveraged leasing cost the
24

Federal government more than buying the ships [Ref. 6]. A
formal rebuttal to the Joint Committee's report was
prepared by Argent for the Navy. Argent's rebuttal tried
to address point by point the differences in relevant costs
identified in its original studies with those delineated by
the JCT.
As of December, 1983, the interim financing necessary
to construct the first three ships has been secured. The
debt and equity portions of the transaction, to transfer
ownership of the vessels on their completion from the ship
builder, are being placed in the leveraged lease markets.
The transfer of ownership from the shipyard to the lessors
allows completion of the leveraged lease to the Navy by
passing legal ownership to the lessors who in turn may then
enter a service contract with the Navy.
B. LEASING
Given the discussion of the current TAKX situation an
examination of leveraged leasing will be presented.
Initially a general lease will be identified and from this
structure a leveraged lease in the public sector will be
described. The differences in the structure of the leases
and the accounting principles to which each type of lease
must adhere for tax purposes together with the associated
tax benefits form the crux of the lease versus purchase





Leasing in the very basic sense is nothing more than a
financing arrangement for one entity to procure the
services of an asset without having to provide sufficient
funds to purchase the asset directly. Instead, it rents
assets from another institution, thereby gaining the
services it needs without providing the captial (or
liability) necessary to purchase outright. The promulgated
Generally Accepted Accounting Principle (FASB-13) defines a
lease as an agreement that conveys the right to use assets
(tangible or intangible) for a stated period [Ref. 7]. The
leasing alternative must be evaluated in light of standard
financing considerations such as:
1) The internal cost of capital of the lease payments.
2) The length of time for which the asset will be
productive
.
After management has decided to lease an asset, and
before the agreement is signed the lessee must decide on
how to classify the lease for accounting purposes. The
classifications of the lease is important for it impacts
heavily on the financial statements of the parties involved
and also on how the lease is treated for tax purposes. The
types of leases include direct financing, sales-type,
operating, and capital. Each distinction will be discussed





1 . Capital and Operating Leases
From the lessee's perspective a lease can be
classified as either a capital lease or an operating lease.
This distinction is critical since operating leases are
'off balance sheet' and capital leases are 'on balance
sheet' [Ref. 8]. Off balance sheet financing means that
the lease is not reported as an asset or liability on the
balance sheet, as opposed to an on balance sheet financing
where an asset and corresponding liability are recorded.
As will be discussed later the Navy's opinion of the TAKX
transaction is that it is an operating lease. This
distinction in classifying the lease is one of substance
over form. The distinction is based on which party of
either the lessor or lessee substantially acquires the
benefits and risks associated with ownership and most
important how the lease will be treated for tax purposes.
[Ref. 8]
A lease that transfers basically all the benefits
and risks inherent in the ownership of property is called a
capital lease. Such a lease should be accounted for by the
lessee as 'on balance sheet', recording as an asset the
present value of unpaid rents and accordingly the same
value as a liability [Ref. 7]. Transfer of ownership and
hence the determination of a capital lease is defined by
meeting one of the four following criteria:
27

1) By the end of the lease term, ownership of the leased
property is transferred to the lessee.
2) The lease contains a bargain purchase option. Note:
a bargain purchase option identifies a lessee's
option to purchase the leased property at a bargain
price that makes the exercise of the option almost
certain
.
3) The lease term is substantially (75% or more) equal
to the estimated useful life of the leased property.
4) At inception of the lease the present value of the
minimum lease payments, with certain adjustments, is
90% or more of the fair value of the leased property.
[Ref. 8]
Capital type leases are classified as direct
financing or sales type leases on the lessor's balance
sheet. A direct financing lease and sales type lease are
essentially the same transaction. Both assume:
1) The benefits and risks of ownership are transferred
to the lessee.
2) Collectibility of the minimum lease payment is
reasonably predictable.
3) No important uncertainties exist regarding the cost
to be incurred by the lessor under the terms of the
lease [Ref . 8]
.
The difference in a direct financing lease relative to a
sales-type is that under a direct financing lease, the
lease does not result in a manufacturer's or dealer's
profit or loss to the lessor, where in a sales- type a
profit or loss would occur [Ref. 7]. In a sales-type lease
the fair value of the leased property at the inception of
the lease differs from the cost or carrying amount; in a
direct financing lease, the fair value of the leased
28

property at the inception of the lease is the cost or
carrying amount. This is because a manufacturer's or
dealer's profit usually exists in a sales-type lease and
fair value is defined as the normal selling price of the
property. In a direct financing lease fair value is cost
[Ref. 8]. Therefore, in the ensuing discussion of TAKX,
its residual value and market value at the 25 year point
are assumed to be equal and, therefore, TAKX is considered
to be a direct financing lease. The direct financing
distinction is important because from the lessor's
perspective the lease can be deemed a true lease for tax
purposes and qualify for the existing tax benefits.
Conversely, operating leases are 'off balance
sheet' because the lease is not reported as an asset or
liability on the balance sheet, and the rental payments are
charged to expense in the period incurred. [Ref. 7]
The lessor in a captital lease recognizes income
from a capital lease by amortizing unearned income over the
lease term so as to produce a constant periodic return on
the net lease investment. However, in an operating lease
the lessor reports income over the lease term when, and as,
it becomes receivable. Accounting for an operating lease
is usually not acceptable to the lessor because of the
deferral of income as noted above, which results solely
from its classification. [Ref. 8]
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Within the scope of this thesis the classification
of the lease will only be of consequence in determining the
tax benefits held by the owner of the asset. The above
discussion was presented to provide a common reference for
several issues that will be discussed later.
2 . True Lease
Most of the economic benefits commonly associated
with leasing are available only in a "true" lease. The
requirements for a true lease for income tax purposes are
easier to meet than the financial requirements for
classifying a lease as an operating lease. [Ref. 8]
A true lease is a tax oriented lease in which the
lessor claims and passes through to the lessee most of such
tax benefits in reduced rental payments. "The lessor
claims depreciation deductions and the lessee deducts the
lease payment as an expense. The Investment Tax Credit
(ITC) may be claimed by the lessor or, by agreement, the
lessee. The lessor owns the leased equipment at the end of
the lease term." [Ref. 8]
In order for a lease to qualify as a true lease for
tax purposes all of the following criteria must be met:
1) At the beginning of the lease, the estimated fair
market value of the leased asset at the end of the
lease term will equal or exceed 20% of the original
cost of the asset.
2) At the beginning of the lease, the estimated
remaining useful life of the leased asset at the end
of the initial lease term will equal or exceed 20% of
the original estimated useful life of the equipment
and be at least one year.
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3) The lessee must not have a right to purchase or
re-lease the leased property at the end of the lease
term or at the time such right is exercisable at a
price which is less than its fair market value.
4) At the beginning of the lease and at all times during
the entire lease term, the lessor must have a minimum
unconditional * at risk' investment equal to at least
20% of the cost of the leased property [Ref. 7].
Again, the financial accounting of leases and their
classification under IRS regulations may differ. As will
be discussed later, the classification for accounting
purposes according to GAAP is just as important as the
structure of the leveraged lease for tax purposes which
allows for the movement of the tax benefits to the entity
that can best utilize the deductions.
In a standard leasing arrangement there are two
parties; the lessee and the lessor. Given the need exists
and the decision has been made to lease the asset, it is
the user-lessee's responsibility to identify to the
manufacturer the specifications of the asset and negotiate
its price. After negotiation of the sales contract the
lessee enters into an agreement with the lessor, the lessee
assigns its purchase rights to the lessor who then buys the
asset. The lessee will begin to pay rent to the lessor.
These rents are net and it is the responsibli ty of the
lessee to pay taxes, service, and insurance associated with
the asset [Ref. 8]. As previously stated, the options at
the end of the lease term determine the nature of the lease
for tax purposes. All lease arrangements discussed from
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this point hence will be assumed to be structured as a true
lease for tax purposes. A simple diagram of the above
mentioned lease is depicted in Figure 2-1.
C. LEVERAGED LEASING
"Leveraged lease transactions, as the term is generally
used, are structured as true leases for tax purposes."
[Ref. 8] However, as opposed to normal operating leases, a
leverage lease is an extremely complex legal transaction.
Due to its complexity and cost to implement, the leverage
lease is mostly used in multi-million dollar projects
requiring the services of experts in accounting, taxation,
and law [Ref. 9]
.
From the purview of the Federal Government there are
three types of leveraged leasing:
1) private sector leveraged leasing.
2) Tax exempt leveraged leasing (non-profit or
non-federal public entities)
.
3) Leveraged leasing by the Federal Government.
A leveraged lease involves three parties; 1) the
lessee, 2) the lessor, also referred to as the equity
participant, and 3) the lender, also referred to as the
debt participant [Ref. 9]. The lessor must provide at
least 20% of the purchase price of the asset to meet item 4
under the true lease qualifications above. The lender
provides the remaining funds to buy the asset. The proper
mix of equity and debt funding is computed to maximize the
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rate of return to the lessor. The lenders return is simply
the interest on the outstanding debt and therefore is not
heavily weighted in deciding the mix. 'Private-sector 1
leveraged leasing is a form of financing whereby using
debt, the lessor is able to "leverage" the tax benefits of
ownership. The lessor obtains accelerated depreciation and
investment tax credit benefits with only a small (20%)
capital investment. These benefits can be passed on to the
lessee in the form of lower rentals. The lessor, instead
of putting up 100% of the cost of the equipment to be
leased, puts up some portion of the cost and finances the
remaining initial cost of the asset with non-recourse debt
from an outside lender [Ref. 9]. Additionally, GAAP
defines a leveraged lease with respect to the lessor for
classification purposes as a direct financing lease.
Figure 2-2 depicts the arrangement and participants
necessary for a leveraged lease.
However, due to its complexity the leveraged lease
involves many more than the three participants noted above.
Figure 2-3 shows what a standard leveraged lease looks like
graphically. A detailed example will be provided to
identify the participants and their relationships in a
leveraged lease involving the charter of a U.S. flag
vessel
.
As stated previously, in a leveraged lease the owner
(lessor) of the asset employs borrowed funds to provide a
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portion of the financing of the asset. In general,
approximately 20 to 30 percent of the purchase price of the
asset is provided by equity funds; the remaining 70 to 80
percent is provided from some other financing institution,
usually a consortium headed by a bank. Using the leveraged
lease vehicle for the financing of a U.S. flag vessel (any
merchant of U.S. registry) , seven (7) parties are involved.
The first party is the charterer, a substantial institution
of better than average size, with a long term requirement
to move a product from one location to another. An example
could be a chemical company moving raw materials purchased
in a foreign country to the United States for processing in
its production plant. The Charterer (the lessee) usually
holds a strong credit rating, comparable to AA or AAA from
Moody's or Standard and Poors. "The charterer is the
primary credit on the agreement and agrees to pay for the
use of the vessel over a long term period whether the
vessel is in use or not". [Ref. 10] These payments are
often called 'Hell or Highwater payments' because operating
circumstances have no effect on their requirement to be
paid. In effect the lessee guarantees the financing of the
vessel [Ref. 5] .
The second party is the equity participant (the lessor)
who for tax purposes is considered the owner of the vessel.
To qualify as owner the 20% minimum investment provided by
the lessor must come from equity funds, not debt. By
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holding the title to the vessel the equity participant can
apply the benefits of the investment tax credit and
accelerated depreciation for the entire cost of the vessel
to its existing profits and shelter them in the early years
of the lease agreement, (i.e., the lessor is able to
leverage 100% of the tax benefits of ownership against only
a true investment of approximately 20%)
[Ref. 10]. A sinking fund is established to ensure early
gains are available to assist in the later years of the
lease when the deductions are no longer available.
Finally, when the lease expires, the equity participant can
benefit from the residual value of the asset. However, a
lease with a residual at any material amount above scrap
value is usually not expected.
The third party in the leveraged lease is the supplier
of the debt funds required to provide the remaining balance
of the purchase price of the vessel, known as the debt
participant or lender(s). Generally, the debt participant
is an aggregation of participants headed by a major bank or
financing institution. (Morgan Guarranty Trust and General
Electric Credit Corporation are frequent debt
participants.) The percentage of the purchase price to be
supplied by the lenders is 70 to 80 percent of the original
cost of the asset and is non-recourse to the lessor.
Defined in the context of the lease, non-recourse debt
relieves the equity participant from any liability to the
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lenders in the event the charterer defaults with respect to
the lease. (The lessor is still at risk for his own equity
investment.) Essentially, the charterer is the primary
credit for the lease [Ref. 10]. Additionally, the lendor's
loan is secured by a first lien on the equipment, and an
assignment of rental payments. The lendor would look to
the credit worthiness of the lessee as well as the value of
the equipment to be leased for the security of the loan.
[Ref. 10]
The fourth participant is the owner trustee. By
engaging an owner trustee, the lessor is insulated from
liability on the bonds issued to the debt participants, the
lessor avoids having to identify these liabilities on his
balance sheet and avoids any regulatory considerations
involved in the issuance of the secured bonds.
The fifth participant is the indentured trustee. The
indentured trustee maintains a relationship with the
lenders analogous to the relationship between the lessor
and the owner trustee. It is the responsibility of the
indentured trustee to hold the security interest for the
benefit of the lender. The indentured trustee receives the
rental payment from the lessee which he distributes
appropriately to the lender (s) and to the lessor via the
owner trustee [Ref. 9]. In a sense the indentured trustee
may be thought of as an honest broker, in that all of the
monies involved in the transaction flow through his hands
at one time or another.
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The sixth party is a ship operating company, also
known as the Bareboat Charter or Offeror. The operator is
charged with all of the functions involved in operating the
vessel during the lease period. [Ref. 10]
The seventh party, although not a member of the
leveraged lease transaction is the shipyard that will
construct the vessel to the specifications of the lessee.
"In some cases, the operator and shipyard are not part of
the arrangement in any form. This occurs when the
charterer is able to operate the vessel directly or when
the financing is undertaken for an existing vessel."
[Ref. 10] Our subject, the TAKX leveraged lease, involves
the new construction or immense retrofitting of the ro-ro
vessels. Therefore, because it is essentially a new
construction vessel, and the unusual structure of the
contract between the U.S. Navy is important in assuring the
availability of various tax benefits, the shipyard and
offerer will be included as members of the transaction.
Figure 2-4 depicts graphically the flow of funds
between the parties involved in a leveraged lease in the
private sector, and indentifies several of the more crucial
documents related to the financing. The heavy, dark lines
originating from the lessor and lenders delineate the
original funding required to purchase the vessel from the
shipyard. This transaction is processed by the indentured
trustee with the title passing from the shipyard to the
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owner trustee. The owner trustee issues the mortgage and
bonds to the lenders to properly document thier lien and
collateral. The owner trustee also issues trust
certificates to evidence the ownership of each equity
participant and establishes the bareboat charter with the
ship operating company (offerer). The lessee holds a time
charter agreement with the offerer to set down the
operational requirements of the vessel. However, the lease
payments consisting of two parts (the capital hire and the
operating hire) is made directly to the indentured trustee.
The indentured trustee transfers the operating hire to the
offerer, services the debt for the bonds held by the
lenders, and provides the excess of revenue over debt
service to the owner trustee [Ref. 11]. After payment of
trustee fees and any other expenses, the owner trustee pays
the remainder of the capital hire payment to the equity
participants
.
The leveraged lease is attractive to the equity
participants for numerous reasons. First, tax benefits are
gained from the entire value of the vessel even though the
equity portion invested is only 20 to 30 percent. In
Senator Howard Metzenbaum's testimony before the Senate
Finance Committee, July 19, 1983, he stated,
"In 1981, for example, General Electric earned $1.6
billion in profit, but bought so many tax breaks that it
actually received a $100 million tax refund." [Ref. 12]
The lessor, as owner, of the vessel is required to
include in its taxable income any rental income received
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wn(the portion of the capital hire that eventually flows do
to him) but he is also entitled to recover the cost of the
property through depreciation deductions under the
Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS) enacted under the
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (ERTA) [Ref. 5]. Under
ACRS, cost recovery deductions are taken for five years for
the cost of the vessel, even though the useful life is 25
years longer. This is a significant tax advantage over
previous methods of accelerated depreciation in which the
depreciation expense had to be spread over the entire
useful life of the asset prior to ERTA. Table 2-1 presents
the depreciable charges per year allowed under ACRS.
Another primary benefit to the equity participant occurs
from the Investment Tax Credit (ITC) , which is a reduction
of taxes to businesses purchasing capital assets. In
effect this allows the lessor to claim a specified
percentage (i.e., 10%) of new capital investment as credit
against income taxable in the current year. The ITC was
granted under legislation designed to encourage firms to
invest in new assets and stimulate the economy and create
new jobs. The following example is provided below to

















Firm A (eventual lessor) invests $200,000 equity funds to
purchase a $1,000,000 vessel.
Investment Tax Credit = 10%
Taxes originally due = $1,500,00
Marginal Tax Rate = .46
Example:
Year 1
Taxes originally due $1,500,000
Less ITC 10% 100 ,000
$1,400,000




This example highlights the fact that with only a $200,000
investment the lessor can reduce taxes by $169,000 in the
first year alone. Table 2-2 depicts tax savings for all
five years that ACRS would apply. In each of the first
five years the overall tax burden of the lessor is reduced
by the percentage applicable under ACRS.
The charterer (lessee) basically gains two benefits.
One, the charterer does not have to raise the capital to
finance the vessel, only to make regular rent payments over
the life of the agreement. If, for example, the charterer





YEAR DEPRECIATION TAX SAVINGS
1 1,000,000 * .15 = 150,000 (*.46) = 69,000
2 1,000,000 * .22 = 220,000 (*.46) = 101,200
3 1,000,000 * .21 = 210,000 (*.46) = 96,600
4 1,000,000 * .21 = 210,000 (*.46) = 96,600
5 1,000,000 *




of additional capital assets. Additionally, from the
lessee perspective leasing would match the consumption of
the asset with its use. Two, the charterer may not desire
the benefits of ownership tax credits due to his own low
tax bracket. However, via the leveraged lease connection
to an equity-lessor in a 46% range, the lessee can expect
some of the leveraged lease savings to be passed onto him,
and thus achieve some measure of the tax benefits without
actually owning the asset.
D. TAX EXEMPT LEVERAGED LEASING (TELL)
It was the intent of the Federal government to
stimulate business growth with the adoption of ERTA, 1981.
An unintended consequence of this legislation has provided
a new source of funding to State and Local Governments,
universities and other tax-exempt entities by using the tax
exempt leveraged lease. Basically, state and local
governments are using their ability to issue tax-exempt
bonds and the tax advantages of a leverage lease in a
combined way to decrease their cost of capital. [Ref. 13]
There are two primary ways for a non-federal public
entity to decrease it's cost of capital via a leveraged
lease. In the first instance, industrial development bonds
(IDBs) are issued in behalf of the lessor to finance the
sale of public property to the lessor. The capital
generated by the sale of IDBs is utilized by the lessor to
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purchase the public property. The lessee immediately
leases back the property at a rent below the normal market
value of the asset because part of the tax advantages
(i.e., negative tax flow) accruing to the lessor are
forwarded to the lessee. The proceeds of the sale could be
used by the State Government (lessee) to purchase taxable
bonds, which yield a higher rate of interest than the
tax-exempt bonds, and the interest gained can then be used
to cover rental payments, meet other current expenses, and
provide a sinking fund to repurchase the property at the
end of the lease. Such arrangements at this time have not
been tested under the anti-arbitrage rules which prohibit
the issuance of tax-exempt bonds for the expressed purpose
of purchasing taxable securities yielding a higher rate of
return. [Ref. 13]
The second example enables state and local governments
finance major capital projects. To initiate this
financing, a municipality sells a public building to
private investors and simultaneously leases it back on a
long term basis for continued use. The municipality then
makes lease payments to the investors. The investors, in
turn, make a downpayment and contribute over a five year
period equity equal to 25-30 percent of the sales price.
This infusion of equity radically reduces the rents in the
first five years. The balance of the sales price is again
financed by IDBs issued on behalf of the lessor. The sale
48

proceeds then finance the intended capital investment. As
described earlier, in purchasing the facility the private
investors obtain the tax benefits of ownership. The
subsidized base payments during the initial five years are
a reflection of these benefits. Lease payments represent
the government's unit cost of financing. In reducing the
magnitude of the lease payments, TELL slashes the
government unit's effective borrowing cost below the
issuer's current tax-exempt rate. [Ref. 13]
The above discussion of TELL provides a simple basis
for the delineation of how IRS policy can make leveraged
leasing appealing. The following discussion of FITELL
introduces the added complexity of evaluating a leveraged
lease when the Treasury Department and the lessee (i.e., a
federal agency) are one entity.
E. FEDERALLY INVOLVED TAX EXEMPT LEVERAGED LEASING
(FITELL)
Prior to the Economic Recovery Act of 1981 (ERTA) it
was always more expensive for a government agency to lease
an asset for its entire life than to purchase it. "Since
leasing is merely a technique for financing the purchase of
a capital asset, the government agency incurred lower costs
by purchasing. Its implicit cost of funds was lower than
that paid by a private leasing company, which would have to




However, with the passage of ERTA, and its accompanying
ACRS and ITC deductions, a lessor could lease an asset to
an agency at a more favorable rate than a standard lease
would allow if some of the cost reductions were passed on
in the rent charged. Therefore, with the purchase of
noncombatants virtually doomed in Congress the Navy looked
for alternative ways of procuring the necessary hulls and
leveraged leasing was presented as a viable alternative in
several studies. The Navy pursued it as a way to fulfill
the mission assigned to them. At this time Argent was
engaged to advise the Navy on the intricacies of the
transaction .
The TAKX transaction differs from the structure
presented in Figure 2-4. Under Federal law for the lessor
to qualify for the ITC and ACRS it must be demonstrated
that the Navy. has not acquired an ownership in the vessel.
Additionally, given the lessor really owns the vessel for
tax purposes and if the Navy's charter agreement were
treated as giving the Navy the right to use the ship (a
lease for the ship) rather than as right to transportation
services (a service contract) , this limitation would result
in disallowance of the investment tax credit. This
distinction was made by John Chapoton, Assistant Secretary,
Tax Policy, Department of the Treasury testifying before
the Senate Finance Committee. He said,
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"Whether an agreement is a service contract or a
lease agreement is an inherently factual determination.
Under a lease agreement the lessor generally transfers
possession and control of the property to the lessee for
a stated term, and the lessee is responsible for the
day-to-day operation of the property. In contrast, under
a service agreement, the party who receives the services
from the property may be able to direct when and where
the property is to be used; but control, possession, and
day-to-day operation of the property remain with the
supplier." [Ref. 1]
In terms of the contract, the Navy is not engaged in a
leveraged lease but a service contract for transportation
services with the party described in Figure 2-4 as the
offerer [Ref. 11]. The substance of the arrangement as
depicted in Figure 2-4 remains the same, except that for
IRS purposes the offeror becomes the lessee. The offeror
may be thought of as an intermediary for tax purposes,
while the Navy is still thought of as the true lessee.
This distinction is made because of the determination of
the capital hire rates. These rates are based on the
credit rating of the lessee in this case the government.
For the federal government to receive any type of lease
more favorable than a purchase option the initial rates
would have to be based on the full faith and credit of the
government, not the offeror. The interest margins are so
crucial that any lease rents based on a credit rating less
than the government's would not be attractive to the Navy.
Argent states the leveraged lease option involving the TAKX
transaction involves an area where basis points (i.e.,
1/100 of a percent) make a real difference over the long
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run of the contract in terms of total cost to the
government. In any event, the Navy will make the payment,
as a "Hell or Highwater" rent, it is perhaps conceptually
proper to think of the Navy as the lessee.
All the studies performed agree that the Navy benefits
by the leverage leasing structure, however, charges by the
joint Committee on Taxation and the Government Accounting
Office assert that the Navy is actually using the Treasury
Department, via a negative tax flow, to subsidize its
budget. Therefore, the total cost to the government as a
whole is more than a comparable purchase, somewhat akin to
TELL presented earlier.
The leveraged lease is a most complex financing
arrangement. However, the theoretical arguments underlying
this debate are even more complex. For example, one of the
hardest points to examine is exactly which flows should be
considered in a cost-benefit analysis. In the Argent study
the following flows were considered:
1) At the Navy level there is the stream of capital hire
payments for the 25 year useful life of the vessel.
2) At the Treasury level there is a series of cash
outflows representing the revenue loss to the
Treasury from the tax benefits realized by the lessor
and a series of cash inflows representing the revenue
gain to the Treasury from the taxes payable on income
resulting from the charter transaction. Specifi-
cally, the components of the revenue loss are the
investment tax credit, ACRS deductions, interest
deductions on the long term debt, and amortization
deductions for certain elements of vessel cost not
included in the depreciable basis. Items which give
rise to tax revenues are capital hire payments
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received by the lessor, interest income received by
the lenders, transaction expenses such as legal fees
and fees paid to commercial and investment banks and
other intermediaries involved in setting up the
transaction, and earnings on tax deferrals (i.e., the
so called 'sinking fund 1 ). [Ref. 5]
At this point another question arises: is it fair to
include the income tax paid by shipbuilders that were hired
specifically to build the TAKX vessels, are these shipyard
employee's tax contribution a deduction from the original
lease cost? The frame of reference within which the flows
and reflows are considered as relevant and their values for
cost/benefit purposes becomes gray and is the conceptual
heart of the problem. However, for example the GAO and the
JCT, both argue that the tax paid on interest income
received by the lenders and tax paid on transaction income
received by lawyers, etc. would exist in the market place,
with or without the TAKX and therefore are not relevant
incremental costs allowable in the lease versus purchase
analysis. Argent states that the revenue is directly
attributable to TAKX and consequently is a relevant cost.
In fact, if Argent's explanation is accepted, one could
carry the discussion farther and farther away from the
original TAKX first order flows to more macro or second
order flows, or third order flows that could be argued have
their origin with TAKX and therefore are seemingly relevant
to the decision. in any event, the question of what sould
be considered first order flows, and how these flows impact
the lease greatly affect the outcome of the analysis.
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The proper rate at which to discount payments and
receipts to determine their present value for the lease
versus purchase analysis is another issue of controversy.
OMB Circular A-76 and the Economic Analysis Handbook, DOD
Instruction 7310, state that the capital should be
considered directly funded by revenue and should be
discounted for analysis purposes at 10%, however, the JCT
in its study assumed that the entire TAKX financing would
be debt funded (funded by Treasury Bill sales) at the
prevailing interest rate of 12%. We suggest that the
financing of the TAKX in reality would be funded by some
mix of revenue and debt sources, as part of the entire
Federal budget. [Ref. 5]
Summarizing, the leveraged lease is a very hard
transaction to analyze due to the numerous perspectives
from which it can be viewed. There are theories to discuss
and differing cash flows to consider.
As noted in the introduction, Chapter 3 will present





As an example of the cash flows in a FITELL, we used
the Navy's TAKX program to demonstrate the complexity of
the transaction, and as a point of departure to discuss the
case of the lease alternative. In this chapter a detailed
description of the relevant cash flows is presented to gain
an understanding of this unique lease transaction in which
the charterer (or lessee) is an agency of the Federal
Government. Federal involvement introduces tax flows and
more importantly reflows into the cash flow stream and the
valuation of these presents the analyst with the most
difficulty.
TAKX, as the largest leveraged lease transaction ever
put together, is noteworthy for that reason alone. Add to
that some uncertainty about the true cost and the
transaction then takes on the awful possiblity of a mult-
billion dollar mistake. It has generated intense (and
somewhat belated) interest in Congress and spawned several
studies which come to different conclusions about the
advantages of such a transaction relative to the purchase
alternative. The major studes, which do not reach the same




The Coopers and Lybrand study reviewed the financial
implications of a hypothetical transaction like TAKX
(Analysis of the Convert and Charter Program, 11 February
1982). Argent Group Ltd. produced a series of reports
referenced throughout this thesis. These reports analyzed
hypothetical lease structures initially and then actual
responses to the Requests for proposal. Argent has been
under contract to the Navy to provide leveraged lease
expertise to the Military Sealift Command (MSC)
,
contracting authority for the TAKX. The studies by Coopers
and Lybrand and Argent concluded that under present
economic and tax conditions the Government would benefit
from participation in a leveraged lease transaction.
The Institute for Defense Analysis (Lease versus
Purchase of Naval Auxiliary Ships (Draft, October 1982)
concluded in a draft report that substantial cost savings
were possible through the leveraged lease alternative. A
final report due in November 1983 is supposed to confirm
the conclusion of the draft report that under certain
conditions leasing is better than the purchase alternative.
The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) prepared a report
(Tax Aspects of Federal Leasing Arrangements, 25 February
1983) which found leasing more costly to the Federal
government than purchasing. The General Accounting Office
(GAO) agreed with the JCT in an analysis of long term
leases (Improved Analysis Needed to Evaluate DOD's Proposed
Long-Term Leases of Capital Equipment, 28 June 1983).
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The studies reach different conclusions from
essentially the same data. This chapter will highlight the
differences in the relevant cash flows of the major studies
done by Argent and JCT. Starting with a discussion of the
difficulties inherent in evaluation of FITELL we will then
address the major items within the studies that create the
disparate results.
B. EVALUATION PROBLEMS WITH FEDERALLY INVOLVED TAX EXEMPT
LEVERAGED LEASING (FITELL)
All of these studies at some point mention the lack of
any definitive guidance to evaluate a capital lease. GAO
made the following statement in their conclusions:
"Our suggested statutory language includes some
general requirements for agencies to conduct a complete
lease versus purchase comparative cost analysis when
considering long-term leases. More specific guidelines,
however, should be promulgated by the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) , and in a letter dated
May 19, 1983, we suggested that the Director issue such
guidance." [Ref. 3]
Argent blamed the major differences between their
conclusion and the one reached by JCT on the lack of
guidance and concluded, "Since there was only limited
guidance in conducting a lease versus purchase analysis for
the government's purposes, it is no surprise that the JCT
Staff and Argent independently selected two different sets
of alternatives to compare." [Ref. 5]
The lack of a model to guide the analysis presented a
major obstacle to each analytical effort. It was overcome
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by the development of unique models which, because of the
different critical assumptions, produced significantly
different results.
C. CONCLUSIONS OF THE MAJOR STUDIES
The analysis presented by Argent showed leasing to be a
better alternative than purchasing for both the Navy and
the Government across a wide range of assumptions. The
sensitivity analysis conducted by Argent included a variety
of discount rates, with and without the Investment Tax
Credit (ITC) , various debt to equity ratios and long-term
debt rates. Argent relied, primarily, on a very
sophisticated commerical leasing evaluation program called
Lease Analysis System (LAS) . The primary output of the
program is a minimum lease payment (or schedule of various
levels of payments) that meet certain parameters, such as
long-term debt rate and return on owner's equity.
From the lease payment (or Capital Hire payment)
schedule and other relevant cash and tax flows, Argent
determined leasing to be significantly less expensive on a
net present value (NPV) basis than purchasing. On a
per ship basis, Argent concluded that leasing saved $29.3
million (NPV) over the purchase alternative (see Table
3-1) . This is a 16.1% saving per ship or $380.9 million
for the entire program. [Ref. 5]
On the other hand, the Joint Committee on Taxation




CHANGE IN CAPITAL COST AS A RESULT OF LEASING
(in millions of dollars NPV; discount at 10.25% annually)
(based on data from MAERSK, vessel number three)
JCT
NAVY TREASURY GOV'T
COST, NEW SHIP -178.2 -178.2
RENTAL PAYMENTS 131.7 -59.2 72.5
TAX BENEFITS/ACRS 81.2 81.2
































different conclusion. The basic premise in the JCT
analysis is that the cost to lease must be greater than
purchase because the government enjoys the best credit
rating and can, thus, borrow funds for less than anyone
else. The lender in the leveraged lease will require a
higher rate of interest on funds lent to the TAKX venture
because there is a greater risk than if those funds were
"lent" to the federal government in the form of a Treasury
note or bond. Additionally, transaction costs make the
lease an inherently more expensive alternative.
"Therefore, when the government leases, it
compensates the lessor for greater financing costs than
the government would have borne had it borrowed funds and
purchased the ship. Similarly, to the extent that extra
fees are involved in arranging a sale and lease, and not
merely a sale, the government compensates the lessor, for
expenses that the government would not have borne had it
purchased the ship." [Ref. 6]
JCT found the leasing alternative to be $20.8 million
(11.7%) more expensive per ship than the purchase
alternative. GAO using similar reasoning came to
essentially the same conclusion as JCT. [Refs. 3 and 6]
The differences between the two major studies (JCT and
Argent) illustrate the inherent difficulty in analysis of
FITELL. The true cost of the lease is subject to many
assumptions about market reactions, tax reflows and
long-term investment possibil ites . From their different
assumptions Argent and JCT developed models which produced
the disparate results above. The basic assumptions that
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lead to the different conclusions will be discussed along
with a description of the major cash flows.
D. DIRECT AND INDIRECT CASH FLOWS
The major payment throughout the life of the lease is
the Charter Hire payment which is comprised of a Capital
Hire Payment and an Operating Hire Payment. The Operating
Hire Payment represents the cost to the Navy to compensate
the operator for the services rendered and is considered an
expense under either the purchase or the lease alternative
so is not discussed furtfher. The Capital Hire payment is
the major outflow of funds from the Federal Government but
actually represents only a portion of the true cost. It is
necwssary to combine the direct outflows with other
indirect cash flows (such as tax benefits and deductions)
to determine the full cost. Similarly the Capital Hire
Payment repays the equity and debt participant for the risk
assumed in the transaction but must be considered together
with the other cash flows and tax benefits to show the
total compensation. Each cash and tax flow will be
discussed
.
E. TAKX CASH FLOWS
Specific cash flows of the TAKX financing arrangement
are simplified in the following illustration by elimination
of the Trustees since they are merely extensions of the
major participants and not relevant to the evaluation of
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the cash flow. The major pre-tax cash flows are shown in
Table 3-2. Argent and JCT agree on the results of a basic
pre-tax cash flow analysis which shows a leveraged lease to
be advantageous to the Navy. As the figures in Table 3-1
show, Argent estimates on-budget expenditure savings of
approximately $50 million per ship and JCT estimates only
$37 million. The difference is primarily due to
differences in treatment of residual value and the cost of
a new ship.
In the pre-tax Navy-only analysis the cash flows are
similar to any simple lease. Lease payments are made over
a period of time to secure the use of an asset. In the
simplified version the amount of the lease payments would
be set to provide the owner with a competitive return on
investment after covering the payments due a lender if one
is involved.
The leveraged lease, however, takes full advantage of
the tax credits available to the owner and return on
investment is computed with the tax effect fully applied.
The net result is the Capital Hire the Navy must pay under
the service contract is substantially reduced not only by
the the tax incentives received the the lessor but also by
the earnings of the sinking fund to which the tax benefits
have theoretically been applied.
Table 3-3 lists the tax benefits and liabilities
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be part of the transaction. Figure 3-1 displays the
recurring cash and tax to show the direct payments made by
the Navy (Charter Hire) and owner (debt service) and also
the tax flows that theoretically provide the means for both
the government and the owner to benefit from this
transaction. The total cost to the government of the two
alternatives is shown in Table 3-4 which is the basic model
used to address the specific cash and tax flows in the
following sections.
1. Capital Hire/Tax Paid on Capital Hire
The Navy is obligated by the Time Charter Agreement
to make Capital Hire payments on acceptance and delivery of
the vessle. This payment is the largest outflow of funds
and represents an amount calculated to provide repayment of
the long-term debt obligations to the bondholders as well
as sufficient return to the equity participants. The
Capital Hire payment schedule for TAKX takes into full
account the tax benefits anticipated to be available to the
lessor owner. But there are protections to the owners
included in the final computation of the Capital Hire Rate.
Final computation is done after placement of permanent
financing and at that point, if all financial uncertainties
have been resolved, a schedule of payments is constructed
and agreed to by all parties. This is done just prior to
the delivery of each ship.
Since it is designed to service the long-term debt
portion of the financing and provide return on investment
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for the equity participants the Capital Hire payment is
subject to adjustment to account for changes in many of the
cost factors that were used in the original estimates of
total cost of debt and amount of equity. Also assumptions
made about the degree and timing of the tax benefits are
also subject to change and would force an adjustment of the
Capital Hire Rate. Some of the cost factors which, if
changed from those used in the original calculation of
Charter Hire, would cause adjustment to the rate are:
(a) Basic Capitalized Cost. Includes Construction or
Purchase/Conversion costs plus interim loan costs,
legal fees and othher costs (spare parts,
containers, etc.)
(b) Investment Tax Credit. Owner's ability to deduct
from taxes 10% of the full amount of Basic
Capitalized Cost.
(c) Permanent Financing Rates. interest rates
calculated to be equal to 11% per annum with
specific amortization schedule.
(d) Depreciable Basis. The basis from which the annual
depreciation amount is computed. Under ACRS 97.5%
of Basic Capitalized Cost used as basis. TEFRA 1982
proposed 92.625%.
(e) Delivery Date. Vessel delivery dates affect tax
liabilities of the owners/lessors. Adjustment to
the delivery date may include tax effect.
(f) Debt/Equity Ratio. Calculated to be 57%/43% in
setting original Capital Hire Rate. To be adjusted
to reflect the actual ratio.
(g) Nominal After-Tax Economic Yield. Set in the
computation of Charter Hire at 11.745% per annum.
As can be seen the owner/lessor is protected
against major economic loss and is effectively guaranteed
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an after tax rate of return of 11.745% by virtue of an
agreed process to adjust the Capital Hire Rates to protect
that rate of return [Ref. 15]. The two aspects of the
Capital Hire payments which have caused most comment are
the tax indemnity for the ITC and the "Hell or High Water"
payment clauses.
a. Tax Indemnity
The indemnification of the owner against loss
of ITC has been criticized for giving the owner
extraordinary protection against an unfavorable tax ruling.
JCT describes these provisions as "risks" the Navy has
assumed (rather than the owner) . A different view is
provided by Everett Pyatt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(S&L) .
"All that a tax indemnity does is to provide that if
those expected tax benefits become unavailable because of
the structure of the transaction or because of some
actions taken by the Navy which were not contemplated by
the agreements, the Navy will compensate the lessor for
the loss, so that the lessor's return will remain as
planned. The most significant -- and overlooked -- point
is this: if the Navy should ever have to pay an
indemnity, it merely means that the Treasury has not had
as much of a revenue loss as was contemplated, and that
the entire amount paid by the Navy simply ends up in the
Treasury." [Ref. 4]
If the contracts did not contain such indemnities the
Charter Hire payments would likely be set at a higher
level, to reflect the greater risk. If the tax benefits
are then available the owners collect a windfall and the
Navy and the Treasury both lose.
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b. "Hell or High Water" Payments
Payments are required to be made semi-annually
and are due no matter whether the ship is in a Reduced
Operational Status (inactivity at the Charterer's
direction) or in an Off Hire status due to inability to
perform the mission because of an event that prevents the
full working of the vessel. This protection to the debt
and equity participants is known as "Hell or High Water"
payments and is not unusual in a leveraged lease
transaction
.
"Also the levering effect is achieved without much
risk since the charterer takes the exposure on the
financing and use of the vessel. Even if the vessel is
unable to operate the charterer must continue to make
lease payments." [Ref. 10]
Capital Hire Payments are included in the
Navy's budgets as a Navy Industrial Fund annual item in the
Operation and Maintenance, Navy (OMN) appropriation. This
has caused concern in Congress because the payments are
characterized by some as long-term obligations that should
not be included in a revolving fund. Also Congressional
review of OMN is not as detailed as other appropriations
such as Ship Construction Navy (SCN) . The visibility of a
major program like TAKX is lessened in the OMN
appropriation, and Congress has expressed concern about the
level of oversight exercised in TAKX and whether all
appropriate information was available during the budget





The Navy's annual payment of Capital Hire per
ship is expected to be approximately $15 million per year
for the first 12.5 years and then $18 million for the last
12.5 years of the contract. The amount is calculated on a
per ship basis and is not fixed until all details of the
long-term financing are known.
The tax reflow to the Treasury from income
taxes paid on the Capital Hire payment is the annual income
times the appropriate marginal tax rate of the owners. It
is calculated in the major studies to be approximately
$59.7 million (NPV) based on the 25 year stream of Charter
Hire payments which has a present value of $131.7 million.
The effect of the tax reflow is to reduce the cost to
Government of the Charter Hire payment to $72.0 million in
present value.
2. Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS) /Investment
Tax Credit (ITC)
As owner of the vessel the equity participants are
entitled to significant tax benefits in the form of
Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS) deductions and
Investment Tax Credits (ITC) . The ITC is a reduction of
the tax liability after an investment is made in a
qualified capital asset. The reduction is currently set at
10% of the amount invested. The ACRS allows a qualified
capital asset to be depreciated over a much shorter period
than normal depreciation allowances. This permits an
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investor to recover the cost of a capital investment in as
little as three years rather than over the full useful life
of the asset.
The net present value of the ACRS/ITC tax benefits
is greater than $80 million per ship.
ACRS/ITC combined with the rental payments (Capital
Hire) net to the equity participants a return sufficient to
make a leveraged lease attractive. The depreciation tax
shield under ACRS allows rapid recovery of the investment
and provides a significant shelter for other income.
Sheltered income is then available for reinvestment and a
sinking fund method can be applied to estimte the long-term
benefit to the owner of that reinvestment. [Ref. 16]
The current law allows ACRS deductions of 15, 22,
21, 21 and 21% of 97.5% of the base cost of the ship over a
five year period. A recent change contained in the Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA)
effective in 1985 requires the depreciable basis to be
reduced by one-half the amount of the ITC claimed by the
lessor and changes the annual depreciation allowance.
As described in the previous section if a revision
to the tax law does cause a reduction in the depreciable
basis the Charter Hire payments are adjusted to preserve
the agreed rate of return. The Investment Tax Credit (ITC)
is deducted directly from a corporation's tax liabilities
usually in the first year of investment. The financial
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incentive for corporations to make investments for capital
goods is enhanced by the ITC and this stimulation of
capital formation was exactly the intent of Congress when
the ITC was voted into law in 1962. TAKX, despite other
criticism, does comply with the intent of the ITC by
encouraging the formation of capital assets. The tax
incentive provided by Congress is used as intended, only
the Federal government is more actively involved than
originally envisioned.
a. Tax Consequences of Ownership and Government
Use Restriction
Two considerations are pertinent to the tax
treatment of TAKX participants. Who is the owner of the
asset? If the Navy is not the owner what is the nature of
the contract with the owner/operator — a contract to lease
an asset or to purchase services? The tax benefits depend
on the answers to these questions.
A basic assumption in the application of ACRS
and ITC tax benefits to the TAKX is that the equity
participant will be deemed the owner and therefore eligible
for these deductions. The TAKX transaction is structured
to insulate the Navy from the presumption of ownership but
final determination will be made by the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS). As desribed earlier the ruling on ownership
to be handed down by the IRS will be based on the substance
of the transaction rather than the form and if the Navy is
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determined to have an ownership interest, the ITC and ACRS
will not be available to the equity participants. The
owner/lessor is not protected against that catastrophic
risk
.
"The Navy is not required to indemnify the shipowner
for any loss of Federal income tax benefits attributable
to characterization of the transaction as a conditional
sale to the Navy." [Ref. 6]
Along with the loss of ITC also goes ACRS deductions and
the owner will only be allowed normal depreciation
allowances over the useful life of the asset.
If the equity participants are deemed to be the
owners for tax purposes a further issue must be resolved
concerning the government "use" restriction. An ITC is not
allowed for property used by a governmental entity but is
available where the government is merely purchasing
services that involve that particular asset. In the latter
case, the lessor is providing services to the government
rather than use of the particular asset. The IRS has
allowed ITC to be taken in cases in which an asset is used
by the owner to provide a service to the government.
"...one court has held (and the Internal Revenue
Service has ruled) that the investment credit can be
claimed where the government unit essentially has
contracted for a service to be provided by the owner of
the equipment rather than for the use of the equipment
itself." [Ref. 6]
In the form of the TAKX contract the Navy is
purchasing space on a ship to transport cargo rather than
using or leasing a ship directly. The structure of the
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TAKX arrangement has the Navy in a service contract (Time
Charter) with the Contractor and the Contractor in a lease
with the owner (or owner trustee) for the bareboat charter
of the vessel. The Navy, in the terms of the contract, has
hired transport services from the Contractor rather than
acquired an ownership or even "use" interest in the ship.
[Ref. 5]
This point is under dispute. Others view the
same contract as other than a "service" arrangement and
claim that the Navy really has possessory interest in the
ships. If that is shown to be the case in upcoming IRS
rulings, the ITC amy be disallowed. The Navy has
indemnified the owners against the loss of the ITC which
may be the outcome of the use restriction issue.
As a flow in the transaction the ITC is
critical because it is applied as a direct reduction of
income tax liability and is therefore a major factor in the
rate of return calculation. The lessor is protected
against loss of the ITC by the indemnification clause which
automatically adjusts the Capital Hire payment the
required amount to protect the 11.745% nominal after-tax
return. Any payment by the Navy of increased Capital Hire
to make up for lost entitlement to ITC will result in a
direct ref low to the Federal Government. The reduction in
tax credits of the lost ITC will cause the increased
payment to flow back into the Treasury as increased tax
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liability on the part of the owners. Theoretically, the
net result to the Treasury of the increase in Capital Hire
is essentially zero.
b. Sophisticated Market Argument
Argent also presents an interesting argument
for elimination of the ITC/ACRS tax benefits as a cost to
TAKX. It is based on the perception of the leveraged lease
investors as a sophisticated group who, because of their
opportunistic approach to investment markets, will find a
means to claim equivalent tax benefits with or without the
TAKX program.
This claim by Argent presupposes a small group
of elite investors who are able to shelter and protect
income regardless of TAKX. Since they are likely to have
these benefits in either case Argent argues against
assigning the cost of these benefits to TAKX.
Another view of the market, however, assumes
the same sophisticated investors will add TAKX to their
existing investment opportunities thereby increasing the
total tax benefits claimed. JCT believes this will be the
true market reaction and the tax benefits are therefore a
proper incremental cost of the TAKX program.
c. Finite vs. Infinite Market Theory
The argument against charging tax benefits as a
cost to TAKX also presumes a certain market reaction to a
large debt offering. Argent argues that the leveraged
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lease market is composed of a finite number of investors
who have an understanding of such complicated lease
arrangements. Only those investors or packagers of such
debt who possess or have access to the requisite expertise
would risk such large amounts of capital.
How the market reacts to increased opportunity
will determine the proper amount of tax flow to consider as
a cost of the program. If the market is finite there will
be no expansion and as TAKX is accepted some other debt
will be displaced. But the total tax benefits claimed from
leveraged lease transactions remains the same regardless of
TAKX.
On the other hand, if the opportunity to invest
funds in leveraged lease transactions increases and the
market expands to accept the new offerings Treasury
revenues will decrease because of an increase in tax
benefits claimed. As the market expands due to the entry
of TAKX the incremental decrease in tax renenues should be
a cost to the leasing proposal [Ref. 6]. However, if
capital assets will be created by such investment the
additions to employment, income and wealth can be argued as
compensation for the lost tax revenue.
JCT obviously does not subscribe to the theory
that tax benefits generated by TAKX are irrelevant costs to
leasing since they would be enjoyed by sophisticated market
investors who operate in a finite system of leveraged lease
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transactions. Instead JCT argues that the leveraged lease
market is not as finite nor as sophisticated as Argent
believes but rather is expandable and would do just that to
accomodate an attractive offering such as TAKX. JCT,
therefore, believes the total tax loss to the Treasury
would increase as a result of TAKX and the incremental
increase in tax revenue lost is a legitimate cost to
leasing
.
d. Debt Market Displacement
In a finite market the entry of a large debt
offering like TAKX can have two outcomes. One is to cause
corporate plans to change and a course of action to be
cancelled because of lack of funding from the specific,
leveraged lease market. If this is the case, there is
potential for the assignment of a "social cost" to the
proposal that caused the displacement. In other words,
TAKX could be seen to cause a project to be postponed, and
the related benefits foregone would then be attributed as a
cost to the TAKX program.
In a similar fashion, though, the purchase
alternative may also be associated with a "social cost."
The financing required to make the full price in a
government purchase can be considered to have a tax revenue
and a debt component. To the extent that the debt
component competes with corporate or other financial
offerings in a finite debt market, the cost of purchasing
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could be increased by a "social cost" similar to that which
is assigned to leasing but not necessarily of the same
magnitude
.
In the second possible outcome the displacement
is not absolute, and Treasury revenues may in fact increase
by the addition of TAKX to a finite leveraged lease market.
This could occur because the debt is placed in some other
part of the total debt market rather than foregone. The
debt placement into a less tax advantaged segment of the
market may cause tax revenues to rise. [Ref. 5]
As has been discussed, there is likely to be a
significant difference between the amount of funds
"borrowed" in a purchase and in a leveraged lease
transaction. "Social cost" is a theoretical argument that
does not appear to be quantifiable. None of the studies
have attempted to assign a specific "social cost" to either
alternative but mention it as a skeleton in the financial
closet. The tax benefits remain in the analyses as a cost
of leasing; in Argent's case presumably more from
conservatism than firm conviction.
e. Corporate Investment Strategy
Corporations are committed to acquisitions and
capital expenditures as a result of an evolving strategy
that is founded on commitment to product lines, geographic
locations, technologies, etc., and is not usually going to
be altered by a financing decision. The acquisition and
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financing decisions are usually separate and capital
strategic expenditures are too important to be postponed if
reasonably affordable financing is available as an
alternative to what was originally thought to be a more
preferrable financial arrangement. The decision to acquire
an asset or make a strategic move is usually made
independent of the financing decision and from that point
can take on almost a life of its own. Depending on the
vitality of that life the project would not necessarily die
but become a candidate for a different type of funding.
The displacement might occur but would not be absolute as
other debt offerings sought the next best alternate segment
of the market. At some point though the total market would
need to adjust to accommodate the increase which
historically means an upward shift in interest rates until
the market adjusts to equilibrium. [Ref. 16]
f. Long Term vs. Short Term Market Reaction
Because of the extraordinary expertise required
to participate in a leveraged lease transaction those who
actively participate in the market are rather limited. It
is an imperfect market and entry involves knowledge of an
unusually complex transaction. Additionally, those in the
market are limited by their own strategic goals and are
concerned with rationing their tax shelter to coincide with
the limited tax liability of the parent company. Because
of the various constraints on the portfolio as a whole an
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investor might have reason to include a mix of lease
structures that includes some less profitable but, due to
timing of the tax benefits, beneficial to the portfolio as
a whole
.
"A leasing company must operate within various
constraints; the most important constraint is the total
level of tax shelter that can be absorbed. The
availability of current taxable income to shelter is the
scarcest resource for most large lessors. Exhausting
this resource is the most common reason for major lessors
curtailing lease activity. In industry jargon, the
lessor is said to have 'run out of tax dollars' ."
[Ref. 17]
The leveraged lease is not necessarily the most
profitable of the lease markets. A sophisticated investor
will have a series of investments that coincide with the
compliment the estimate of tax shelters needed in the
future. The market mix is dependent on the flow of the
investment and when in the course of the investment the
shelter is available.
Leveraged lease market debt is not, therefore,
the ultimate in tax sheltered investments. It has certain
advantages but also risks and must compete with alternative
long-term financing opportunities. Investors will not
gravitate to the leveraged lease market just for TAKX per
se , but will come for investment opportunities that produce
returns over time commensurate with the perceived risk.
There is no doubt, however, that the
availability of funds for leveraged lease tax sheltered
investments would increase as more relatively attractive
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opportunities were presented. Expertise would be acquired
and the complexities overcome as soon as the leveraged
lease market presents a more profitable alternative to
presently available investments. The overall market
reaction would be in the form of an upward-sloping supply
curve reflecting the fact that at higher interest rates the
supply of loanable funds will increase. [Ref. 18]
But the long-term reaction to more profitable
investment opportunities is not necessarily an appropriate
cost of the TAKX lease proposal. Argent Group is probably
correct to assess the market as finite (in the short-term)
and predict a displacement of other debt offerings into a
less sheltered segment of the capital markets. Since the
timing and degree of a shift in capital markets is not
quantifiable, the more conservative apporach is to consider
the tax benefits as a cost to the TAKX project, in essence
adopting the JCT position that TAKX tax benefits will be
additional revenue loss to the Federal Government. Argent,
despite arguments to the contrary, also presents the
ITC/ACRS as a cost of leasing in most of their cost
comparisons which, according to their calculations, only
lessens the advantage of leasing but does not negate it.
3 . Long Term Debt
The long-term debt portion of the cash flow is the
most complex and controversial of the TAKX finance plan.
Evaluation of the total effects of the long term debt and
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method of application of the various reflows will
ultimately determine the cost of leveraged lease financing.
Much of the difference between the analyses can be
attributed to treatment of the long-term debt portion of
the financing. The disparity in treatment stems primarily
from theoretical assumptions about the nature and
composition of debt markets, interpretations of the market
reaction to increased demand and the basic premise of the
amount of debt to apply to each alternative.
In a FITELL, long term debt is the major item in
the analyses due to the potential for the Federal
Government to recover cost through tax reflows to the
Treasury. This aspect of the financial analysis emphasized
more than any other the different assumptions used in the
studies to predict the cost of the alternatives, especially
the purchase option.
a. Bond Issue
The long term debt in the TAKX is a bond issue
that the lenders buy in competitive markets. The exact
cost of the debt is not known until the market reacts to
the debt offering which will most likely occur just prior
to delivery of the ship. The bonds issued by the lessor
are at a rate and with an amortization schedule acceptable
to the lessor and the charterer since these factors
determine the return to the lessor and the amount of
Capital Hire to be paid by the charterer. To secure the
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debt the lessor assigns the rental payments from the
bareboat charterer (operator), which is the Capital Hire
payment made by the Navy, to the agent of the lender. The
Indentured Trustee services the debt on the bonds before
distributing funds to any other participant. The lessor
also grants a first mortgage on the asset to the holders of
long-term debt. The debt is, therefore, said to be
non-recourse to the lessor since the bondholders must rely
on someone other than the lessor for the ultimate security
of the investment.
The lenders look to the Charterer for credit
worthiness and assurance of fulfillment of the conditions
of the bond. The lenders are also concerned with the
quality of the asset to ultimately secure the loan, if
necessary. The lenders or debt participants in the TAKX,
therefore, will be looking beyond the lessee (operator) to
the Charterer (U.S. Government) by virtue of the service
contract with the lessee for the security of their loan.
Government involvement enhances the financial
character of the offering but complicates the transaction
in another way. The government is seen by the other
participants as central to the financial structure rather
than as a remote entity with no more than a 'use' interest
in the transaction. However, the position the government
finds itself in as charterer/guarantor of the long term
bonds is not unusual in a leveraged lease.
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"One additional characteristic of a leveraged lease
financing is noteworthy. The agreement between the bank
and the equity participant is a non-recourse loan. This
means that the bank cannot require the equity participant
to pay off the loan in the event of a default on the part
of the charterer. The charterer is the primary credit
and the bank has no recourse to collect from the equity
participant." [Ref. 10]
b. Tax Reflow From Interest Earned By Bondholders
The interest earned by the lenders is taxable
and is a potential reflow to the Treasury which, if given
full credit, significantly reduces the cost of the lease
alternative. The degree to which the reflow is applied may
ultimately decide if there is an advantage to the lease
alternative
.
The reflow can be calculated just as any of the
other transfers already discussed such as Capital Hire
payments are considered net of taxes in the computation of
total government costs. Also reduction of the owner's
taxable income based on the amount of interest paid on the
long term debt is considered a cost of leasing. In the
different models these reflows are recognized as valid but
the real issue is the amount of debt figured in the
purchase alternative.
c. Percent Debt in the Purchase Alternative
The controversy about the effect of the
interest earned by the lenders stems primarily from
different assumptions about the purchase alternative to
which the lease is to be compared. Again, the lack of a
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consistent model led the analysts to compare leasing to
subtantially different purchase alternatives. Each model
recognized the existence of tax reflows from the debt
portion of the lease alternative but those in favor of
leasing give them full effect while those opposed see the
effect offset by other factors.
Argent calculates a reflow to the Treasury of
$39.7 million (NPV) per ship directly attributable to the
taxes paid by the lenders on the interest earned from the
long term debt portion of the financing.
JCT considers this tax reflow offset by debt in
the purchase alternative. They maintain that the interest
earned by creditors in the leveraged lease would be
equivalent to the interest earned by the holders of
Treasury debt in a purchase. By considering the two flows
equivalent JCT eliminates them from consideration. For
that to be true, however, JCT must presume the purchase
alternative is to be funded by 100% debt financing.
Identical income tax profiles for the holders of that debt
is also required if the reflows are to be of the same
magnitude. The funds to purchase a TAKX ship would be a
portion of the annual outlays from the Treasury and not
borrowed directly from capital markets like the long term
debt in the lease alternative. A portion of the outlays in
any particular year are, however, borrowed in the capital
markets since the government is currently operating with a
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large budget deficit and ia expected to continue to do so.
As such, a part of the purchase price paid for a TAKX would
actually be funded by Treasury debt which menas there would
be an interest payment to a lender that is taxable. This
taxable portion of the interest payment produces a reflow
to the Treasury in the same manner as Argent claims for the
lease alternative, but it may not be of the same magnitude.
The amount "borrowed" in a leveraged lease
transaction is typically 70-80% of the purchase price but
TAKX debt placement is expected to be 57% based on a
review of the Requests for Proposal. The amount "borrowed"
in a government purchase can be considered to be directly
proportional to the budget deficit which is expected to be
approximately 21-22% in the years 1984 and 1985. The
amounts borrowed under the two alternatives could be
different by as much as $63 million. The difference
increases as the debt portion of the leveraged lease
increases and decreases as the Federal debt rises.
In addition, the lender in the two instances is
likely to be different. The debt participant in a
leveraged lease is looking for a return with an amortized
loan repayment schedule. The marginal effective tax rate
of lenders in a leveraged lease may be higher than that of
lenders to the Federal Government who are receiving
interest payments through the life of the loan and return
of principle at maturity. Purchasers of government long
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term debt instruments may be in a lower tax bracket than
purchasers of leveraged lease debt. Investors such as
pension funds are prevelant in long term government bonds
as opposed to corporations, banks and insurance companies
who are likely debt participants in leveraged lease
transactions. According to Argent they exhibit markedly
different tax profiles and thus produce different reflows
to the Treasury with leveraged lease transactions producing
the greater amount [Ref. 5]. Argent presented no real
evidence in support of this claim.
The tax reflow issue is central to the
evaluation of the TAKX transaction. One's disposition
toward the tax reflow question is the major factor in the
final analysis. Argent calculates the reflows as a
reduction in the cost of leasing, and JCT does not,
producing most of the $50 million difference between the
two analyses. The impact of that belief is $39.7 million
or 20.6% of the net outflows from the Treasury. Without
the reflow to the Treasury, the lease alternative would be
more expensive than purchase by $10.4 million (using all of
Argent's other assumptions about residual value, etc.)
d. Discount Rates
Another aspect of the problem is the question
of the proper discount rate to use for the present value
computation. JCT contends the discount rate (10.25%)
stipulated by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is
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a pre-tax rate and therefore includes the tax effect of a
reflow as well as the anticipated rate on long term debt.
"OMB chooses a discount rate which reflects the
pre-tax cost of funds: the prevailing interest rate on
government bonds. The pre-tax cost of funds is larger
than the after-tax cost by the amount of taxes paid on
the interest income received by the owners of government
bonds. Since this tax reflow to the Treasury is already
included in the pre-tax discount rate, it would be double
counting for government agencies to adjust their outlays
by the estimated reflows." [Ref. 6]
In other words, JCT contends the reflows that
Argent and the Navy consider a reduction to the total cost
of a lease are not only included as a specifically
calculated reflow, but are also implied in the use of the
pre-tax discount rate of 10.25%. Argent and the Navy,
therefore, have "double counted" the effect of the taxable
interest earned on long term debt according to JCT. But
the basic question of the applicable interest rate is
unknowable -- whether pre or post-tax.
Since Argent prepared their studies using
discount rates which varied from 5 to 14%, they feel a full
presentation was made of the range of possible discount
rates. In view of actual rates in the market at the time
Argent believes they have made a better presentation of
real market conditions. At a 12% long term rate for
government debt which was typical at the time of the Argent
analysis and an assumed 13.5% average tax rate for holders
of long tterm government debt and appropriate after tax
discount rate is 10.38%. This is approximately the rate
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used by Argent (10.25%) to discount the flows. Argent then
included the tax reflows as separate items of flow causing
the concern about double counting.
GAO also discussed the proper discount rate to
use in analysis
.
"If the tax liabilities incurred by the investors,
equity and debt owners in the leasing company, were
substracted from the Government costs, the discount rate
would be the after-tax discount rate computed as one
minus the tax rate times the pre-tax discount rate.
Since we do not know the tax rate of the investors, we
discount at the pre-tax discount rate and ignore the
taxes on investor income in our analysis." [Ref. 3]
The GAO study contains the implicit assumption
that the amount of debt incurred in a leveraged lease is
the same as in a purchase.
These major unresolved issues between the
analyses make a precise estimate of the cost to lease vs.
the cost to buy an impossibility. Depending on the point
one wants to prove the issues surrounding reflows can be
argued strenuously in either direction and figures produced
that purport to prove the unprovable. Argent and JCT have
been in the forefront in that regard but neither seems to
have established an irrefutable argument.
4 . Residual Value
The contract signed by the Navy agrees to a
residual value of zero at the end of 25 years. It is not
clear why this was agreed because the tax requirements for
a true lease state the lessor must demonstrate a 20%
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residual value at the conclusion of the lease. Since it is
so far in the future, the difference between the assumed
zero residual value and 20% of the capitalized cost does
not have a large impact on the analysis. The cost to the
government, net of tax, is under $2 million (NPV)
.
The lease payments though are calculated to return
to the owners the full value of the asset over time. The
impact of the assumption of no residual value after 25
years allows the owners to recapture the full amount of the
ship's cost within the Capital Hire payments and to realize
additional return in the actual residual value of the asset
at the 25 year point.
Potential investors are reluctant to estimate a
residual value 25 years in the future and would require an
upward adjustment to the Capital Hire rate to compensate
for the uncertainty if they were required to accept such a
risk. In the agreement as written there is the potential
for the owners to gain from any asset value at the end of
the full lease period. This "upside potential" makes the
risk of such a long term investment more attractive to the
owners and allows the Navy to theoretically pay a lower
rent payment by elimination of that uncertainty of residual
value
.
Argent subsequently suggests a factor of 20% be
used as the residual value because it agrees with the IRS
requirements. Since the government cannot take advantage
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of the salvage value in a lease it should thus be
considered a cost to the lease alternative.
5 . Purchase Price
The purchase price of the vessel is equivalent to
the Basic Capitalized Cost discussed earlier. It includes
the following fixed costs:
a. Cost of Existing Ship (if applicable)
b. Shipyard Conversion or Construction Cost
c. Inspection and Supervision Costs
Additional costs are included to compensate the
owners for legal and financing costs incurred durring the
period of construction and for the arrangement and
placement of the long term financing. These additional
costs are subject to adjustment from their original
estimates at the time the contracts were signed.
The Basic Capitalized Cost also included spare
parts, containers, insurance and a fund for changes to
vessel specifications. [Ref. 15]
The range of purchase price is from $170 to $192




A. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF FITELL
The extent of leasing within DOD or the Federal
Government is not quantifiable but it is widespread, most
notably for data processing equipment. Because of rapid
obsolence computers have been prime candidates for leasing
and in many areas government leasing is required. In fact
the Comptroller General allows the use of Operations and
Maintenance (OMN) funds within DOD to obtain the use of
assets via leasing arrangements that would otherwise
require procurement funds. By applying principles used in
non-government accounting the acquisition of capital assets
via a capital leasing structure would require those assets
be accounted as a procurement. This would ensure that the
total costs to the government would be evident. Otherwise
the total cost of the procurement is in essence "off
budget" if only the yearly rental payment is visible. The
acquisition should be visible in its entirety at the outset
in a procurement appropriation and the yearly rental would
be the amortization of the total cost over the lease term.
TAKX has been utilized by the JCT to highlight this problem
and, considering the $2.4 billion price tag, it is of
sufficient magnitude to warrant the concern expressed in
Congress about such procurements.
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The essential argument is that leasing by government
agencies may distort the budget process. In the case of a
Federal department, a multi-year procurement program is
funded, at the start by a budget authorization which
appears in the procurement portion of the department's
budget account. The actual cash expenditure in each year
of the procurement program appears as an outlay item in the
procurement portion of the budget account. If the
department acquires the same property through a leasing
arrangement, the authorization for the cumulative cost does
not appear as a separate item in the budget. The annual
rental payments appear as an outlay item in the OMN budget
rather than in the procurement account [Ref. 14].
Additionally as with TAKX there may very well be an
associated termination charge liability for early
termination of the contract. in most short-term leases for
ADP equipment a substantial termination charge is unusual
since neither lessor nor lessee expects the user to require
the services of the computer equipment for an extended
period or full useful life. However with TAKX where the
Navy is procuring the asset with full intent to work the
assets for 25 years, an early termination charge is
appropriate and an accepted business principle. This
allows the lessor to accept a lower rate of return due to
the penalty imposed for early termination of the contract,
and accordingly less risk enjoined to the lessor.
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The liability introduced in a long term lease is never
fully disclosed in the budget and only with special
Congressional interest is the entire liability (the lease
payments and possible termination charge) viewed in its
entirety. Thus it would appear that leasing via an expense
appropriation is contradictory to DOD Instruction 7200.4
that implemented the full funding concept. The full-
funding concept was instituted by Congress to provide a
cost threshold of capital acquisitions without specific
Congressional authorization and appropriation. It allowed
Congress to maintain visibility and political control over
equipment being purchased by preventing piecemeal
acquisition of equipment systems by the service via the
requirement that full budgeting and funding for an item
occur in only one year. Obviously this does not happen in
leasing. Historically leasing became increasingly popular
in the private sector in the high- technology post-World
War II era. Capital acquisition via purchase required
large amounts of capital or credit potential for debt
funding, involved uncertainty of equipment and obsolesence,
therefore leading to capital acquisitions via leasing that
compensated others for accepting the debt and risk of
acquiring capital assets. But the governmental budget
process has not kept pace.
"Within the government, it becomes a case where the
appropriation structure is lagging behind the new lease
acquisition strategies of the past 35 years. The
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appropriation structure deals adequately with outright
purchase and the non-capital rental options, but does not
fit squarely with capital type leases." [Ref. 14]
The accounting profession recognizing the private
sector need to properly define capital leases did so in
1976 with Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
Statement number 13, previously discussed in Chapter 2. In
essence TAKX is a capital acquisition via leasing. However
no current provision for economic analysis of acquisition
such as Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76
for Cost Analysis, or adequate appropriation structure is
in existence to review a lease transaction such as TAKX.
A second distortion of the budget process, by leveraged
leasing occurs to the extent that procurement costs are
shifted from the Department's budget to the U.S. Treasury
through reduced tax revenues. As previously stated an
inherent characteristic of leveraged leasing is the large
tax credit to the lessor which theoretically results in
reduced rents to the lessee. Therefore the difference
between the true rent and the reduced rent being paid by
the Treasury can be characterized as a subsidy to the
Department's (the lessee's) budget. That difference never
appears as a separate item on the budget, and the total
cost to the government can never be ascertained from the
unified Federal budget. [Ref. 14]
In point of fact the difference between the true rent
and the reduced rent is based on the marginal tax rate of
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the lessor, the percentage of the difference that is
required to cover transaction expenses and the taxable
income of the lessor so the true difference could only be
calculated at the end of an accounting period and the rate
is variable per year so an accurate estimate could not even
be projected over time. Additionally negative tax flows
are not controlled by the Federal government under the
apportionment process. Thus these discrepancies between
budgetary accounting for procurement by purchase and lease
make it difficult to determine the true cost to the
government of Federal Department leasing programs.
[Ref. 14]
A third component of the problem in Congressional
oversight concerns the nature and the consequences of
accounting for a leveraged lease in an expense appropia-
tion (OMN) . A 25 year lease authorized in the OMN account
in effect creates a 25 year entitlement. An entitlement
that once is authorized in a binding contract cannot be
cancelled without severe penalties. The penalty for
cancellation of the TAKX in FY85 would be $1.42 billion.
So if it is assumed the entitlement is fixed then it can be
classified as uncontrollable, reducing further the
discretionary power Congress has to manipulate the budget.
The current estimate of uncontrollable outlays in the
present DOD budget is 33.9% [Ref. 19]. However if we
include salaries as uncontrollable then the amount is
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closer to 80%. The controllable portion then becomes $40
billion and the cost of TAKX alone reduces this amount by
.5%. Total leasing obligations significantly reduce the
controllable percentage of the budget and Congress strongly
resists such entitlements, especially in the Defense
budget
.
Another argument that is voiced against federal
department leasing involves how much actual control
Congress has over assets leased from the private sector by
agencies. Congressional control within DOD can reach as
far as the deployment of assets overseas to hostile
environments. There are serious doubts in some areas as to
the control Congress can exercise over non-owned assets.
TAKX is a perfect example in point. In the event of
hostilities the interest of the lessors and the Defense
Department may differ considerably about the deployment of
the property.
Whether this is a serous problem today is best
addressed by looking at past experiences. The Navy has the
ability within the contract to direct the ships to
locations to accomplish the mission during a national
emergency or otherwise. If there is concern whether the
crews will comply there is no precedent to substantiate
serious doubt about the willingness of the Merchant Marine
to accomplish their tasks. During World War II, the Korean
War and the war in Vietnam the Navy relied on large scale
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chartering of merchant ships for the transport of vital war
materials into hostile areas. From the performance in the
past there is no reason to suspect the Merchant Marine
would be unreliable in the future. In fact Congress
mandated in the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 that the naval
and military auxiliary stand ready and are capable of
serving in time of war or national emergency and should be
taken into account fully in military strategic planning.
Leveraged leasing has been portrayed throughout this
study as a complex financing tool. The ability to project
costs and reflows requires experts in taxation, accounting,
and law fields. Such expertise is not available within the
Navy to manage a leveraged lease transaction the size and
complexity of TAKX. Argent's total and continuing
involvement with all aspects of the transaction is evidence
of that shortcoming within the Navy establishment. If such
transactions are to continue the required expertise must be
developed
.
There also exists no definitive analytical approach
approved by Congress or OMB to provide guidelines for
agencies to evaluate the lease versus purchase transaction.
OMB Circular A-76 defines the environment in which
procurement transactions must be analyzed. Whether or not
A-76 defines a realistic approach or only an approach to
help rank the alternatives is debatable, but nothing exists
like A-76 for the analysis of leveraged leases. viewing
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all the variables involved it is perhaps unlikely that any
type of single analytical approach can be applied to each
case. Any approach will be considered deficient by some
because it cannot define that which is not definable. This
lack of analysis further reduces congressional oversight.
Congressional staffers, OMB staffers, or DOD staffers all
present different solutions and therefore Congress cannot
judge which alternative is 'best' for the budget.
B. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF TELL
Bennington College sold classrooms and dormitories to
alumni and now leases them. NASA is leasing a satellite
after selling it to private investors. The City of Atlanta
sold City Hall and leased it from the new owners and Miami
is considering the sale and leaseback of the Orange Bowl.
These are examples of TELL in recent news and represent a
growing list of similar transactions that worries Congress.
Like TAKX the TELL involves the sale and lease of an asset
but there are important differences. TELL involves a non-
federal tax exempt entity together in a lease with a
taxable entity. They structure the lease financially so
the tax benefits available to the taxable owners are shared
with the non-taxable lessors, after an asset has been
exchanged
.
Like the FITELL the participants in a TELL agree to the
sale of a depreciable asset (usually a building) owned by
1Q0

the tax exempt entity, to a taxable investor who typically
combines equity and debt to pay the purchase price. A long
term lease to the tax exempt party accompanies the sale.
The tax exempt entity as lessee retains essentially the
same use of the asset as before the sale but is now
obligated to make a series of rental payments to the
lessor. The lessor is entitled to any depreciation, cost
recovery deductions or other tax benefits available to the
owner of the property. There is typically a flow through
to the lessee in the form of reduced rental payments which
reflect the benefits accruing to the owner. The lessor may
in some cases finance the purchase with tax-exempt
industrial development bonds (IDB) .
The Navy, as a part of the federal government, is not a
tax paying entity and as such is not entitled to tax
benefits directly or indirectly in the way a corporate
entity might be. In TAKX the Navy is taking tax benefits,
just like Bennington College or the City of Atlanta is
doing in a TELL, that it is not otherwise entitled to. In
the case of Federal agencies Congress has the budget
mechanism to exercise control. This is not the case in
TELL. The Joint Committee on taxation addresses the
controversy
.
"...did Congress intend that tax-exempt
organizations should receive tax benefits from leased
property which they would not be eligible for if they
purchased the property? Furthermore, because these tax
benefits do not appear in the unified federal budget, it
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is difficult for Congress to determine the amount of tax
revenue given up as a result of nonprofit leasing."
[Ref. 6]
The Navy and other tax exempt organizations have found
a way through leveraged leasing (TELL or FITELL) to benefit
from tax incentives for which they are not otherwise
eligible. As the JCT stated above, Congressional oversight
of expenditures is a significant issue in the case of
Federally funded agencies involved in FITELL because of the
unique combination of "flows", "reflows", and "pass
throughs." The total cost of a Federal project or program
is not now visible to the normal budget process and
Congress is trying to close that gap with legislation.
One essential step is a model that properly evaluates
all the factors to provide Congress with total cost or at
least a sufficiently reasonable method of cost comparison
so informed judgements can be made on projects competing
for scarce funds. Congressional review would then have
both the direct outlays and the tax benefits which together
show the true cost of the program and should be used to
evaluate it.
It is a different matter, though, in tax exempt
leveraged leasing (TELL) . These cases involve non-federal
agencies that enjoy tax exempt status. Senator Howard M.
Metzenbaum described the process:
"Through this practice, tax exempt entities like
cities and universities have, in effect, gone into the
business of selling lucrative tax shelters to private
1Q2

investors. How does this work? Because a city, for
example, does not pay Federal income taxes it is unable
to take advantage of the investment tax credit and
depreciation deductions associated with its property.
But a city can sell a building to a taxpayer, who can
take advantage of the lucrative tax benefits and then
lease the building back to the municipal government."
[Ref. 12]
These transactions result in lost tax revenues to the
Federal Treasury with no possiblity of Congressional review
or oversight on a program or individual basis since these
transactions are out of the Federal budget review process.
Another even stronger criticism of TELL is the sale and
leaseback of existing facilities. If the original intent
of the tax incentive is to stimulate capital investment,
the sale and leaseback by a municipal government or
university of facilities it used to own defeats the purpose
of the tax incentive. it is in effect generating federal
tax benefits that did not exist before the property changed
hands and in essence subsidises municipal treasuries from
the Federal one while reducing capital investment by
soaking up debt funds.
C. LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES
Two bills are now before Congress which are designed to
establish control over the loss of tax dollars from
transactions like TELL and FITELL. In the House the
Government Leasing Act of 1983, H.R. 3110 proposed by
Congressman pickle (D-Ohio) would require straight line
depreciation over extended recovery periods for property
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used by tax exempt entities and would tighten the present
law allowing investment credits for this property.
Extensions are based on the ERTA property class
designations which stratified assets by type into four
groups and specified the length of the recovery periods by
group. The recovery period extensions are:
In the case of Recovery period is
3-year property 5 years
5-year property 12 years
10-year property 25 years
15-year property 35 years
(public/real)
The investment credit provisions contained in the bill
are aimed right at the heart of TAKX:
"The bill would extend the present law denial of the
investment credit for property used by governmental units
and certain tax exempt entities to cover-...
...Property used pursuant to a contract that purports to
be a service contract but is more properly treated as a
lease." [Ref. 20]
The effective date is 23 May 1983 after which any property
placed in service must comply. Any binding Federal
contract in place before that date is exempt only if the
asset is placed in service before 1 January 1984. TAKX
ships are not scheduled to be in service until after
1 January 1984. [Ref. 20]
The impact of the Pickle bill on TAKX would be drastic.
The Navy's undiscounted Charter Hire payment per ship would
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increase from $415 million to $570 million. This is an
increase of over $6 million per ship per year and on a 13
ship program over twenty-five years the total Charter Hire
would increase over $2 billion.
The result of the proposed change in tax law makes
leasing more expensive than purchase by $9 million per
ship. Additionally the program becomes unattractive to
equity investors who see other leveraged leases with ITC
and 5-year ACRS and much less uncertainty.
The Senate legislation is S. 1564 Government Lease
Financing Reform Act of 1983 sponsored by Senators Dole,
Metzenbaum, Durenberger and Grasseley. In general S. 1564
would reduce the tax benefits that would otherwise be
available for property used by tax exempt entities, with
exceptions for certain short-lived property, certain real
property and property subject to short-term leases. The
bill also provides criteria for use in determining whether
an arrangement that is structured as a service contract
should be treated as a lease.
For property leased to or used by a tax exempt entity,
depreciation would be computed using the straight line
method, disregarding salvage value, over the greater of the
present class life of the property under the Asset
Depreciation Range (ADR) System or a period equal to 125%
of the term of the lease. The lease term includes any
period for which the lease may be renewed or extended at
the lessee's option. [Ref. 1]
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The investment credit generally would be denied for
property leased to, or otherwise used by, a tax exempt
entity. The bill would expand the category of tax exempt
entities subject to the restriction by providing guidelines
for distinguishing a service contract from a lease. The
service contract determination centers around these
factors; control and physical possession, possessory or
economic interest, assumption of risk for loss due to non-
performance and use of the property concurrently to provide
services to taxable entities. A transaction structured as
a service contract would be considered a lease if all of
the following were present:
"(1) Employees of the tax exempt entity operate or
assist in the operation of the property,
(2) The property is dedicated solely to the tax-exempt
entity for a substantial portion of the useful life of
the property,
(3) The cost or value of the property dominates the
price of the total arrangement,
(4) The tax exempt entity bears the risk that the
property will decline in value... and
(5) The tax exempt entity bears the risk of damage to or
loss of the property." [Ref. 21]
The Senate legislation contains the same effective date,
23 May 1983, as H.R. 3110 and the same requirement for the
asset to be placed in service before 1 January 1984. Again
the effective date provision only applies to Federal
leases
.
The enactment of either version of leasing reform bills
would drastically effect the TAKX and T-5 transactions.
Mr. Everett Pyatt describes the impact in testimony before
the Senate Finance Committee.
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"The TAKX and T-5 ships are scheduled to be
delivered and placed in service from 1984 through 1986.
Since the contracts are already in place, the effect of
the provision would thus be to require either an
appropriation by Congress to buy the ships or a
cancellation of the program, either of which at this
point would be a substantial and needless expense. In
short, this provision upsets negotiations and contracts
undertaken in good faith and would inflict devastating
effects on the program." [Ref. 4]
The response from the Department of Defense has been
primarily directed toward changing the 1 January 1984 in
service date or "grandfathering" the TAKX and T-5







The studies used throughout the thesis present the
financial extremes of the TAKX transaction. The Navy shows
the leasing alternative (which is the only alternative if
Congress will not approve a purchase) to be a cost
effective means of acquiring the use of these particular
assets. Others who are less involved in the Navy's program
make different assumptions about the financing arrangement
and conclude the transaction is not a cost effective
approach to the problem. In either case the basis for the
conclusions involves assumptions about interest rates, tax
rates, and economic trends that are unknowable twenty-five
years in the future. Any prediction has to be a
simplification of the most dynamic aspects of corporate and
economic life. To base a twenty-five year projection on
such assumptions produces numbers that are only speculative
at best.
The obvious difficulties in projecting costs over such
a long period make a comparison of results of different
studies nearly impossible. It is no surprise the primary
analyses produced different results. If a final tabulation
were possible twenty-five years hence the historical cost
might well be somewhere between the two.
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The Navy was faced with a requirement to provide hulls
for the Rapid Deployment Force. Congressional approval for
the purchase of the necessary auxiliary ships was not
forthcoming so the Navy undertook this "creative financing"
and processed it through Congressional checkpoints to
signature. It was a smart and proper action for the Navy
to take for they end up with the means to fulfill the
assigned mission with little overall budget impact in other
areas. No signifficant tradeoffs in FY83/84 were required
to gain the TAKX and T-5 ships with leveraged lease
financing. Criticism of the Navy by Congress is not well
founded because Congressional requirements were followed
throughout
.
"Regarding the TAKX, Congressional review included a
study by the House Appropriation Committee Surveys and
Investigations Staff hearings by the House Armed Services
Readiness Committee and staff reviews by the Armed
Services and Appropriation Committee of the Senate and
House. All four Committees provided written concurrence
with the Navy plan to finalize the conditional awards for
its chartering program made in mid August, 1982."
[Ref. 4]
Apparently Congress needs to revise the review
procedures for this kind of transaction. For example
Section 303 of the Fiscal Year 1983 Defense Authorization
Act requires the Navy to notify the House and Senate
Committees on Appropriation and on Armed Services before
entering into long-term leases. This requirement only
applies to funds appropriated under the fiscal year 1983
Defense Authorization Act and only to the Navy's ships and
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not to other services. The Navy may proceed with the lease
after 30 days regardless of the views of those committees.
Section 303 is the only requirement for Congressional
oversight of long-term leases and is clearly inadequate.
If Congress is to be aware of the impact and scope of
FITELL new laws are required.
Additionally the manipulation of ITC/ACRS tax benefits
that can occur in TELL or FITELL or leverged leasing
generally is also controllable by Congress if they have the
will. Tax benefits claimed from the transfer of an
existing asset is an obvious distortion of the intent of
the law. These loopholes were not intended in the original
legislation and the legislation almost certainly will be
changed to reflect this.
All of the calculations made by the various entities
are meaningless if equity participants sell their position
after depleting the ITC/ACRS. Those buying in are entitled
to similar tax benefits and if this occurs it further
complicates the cost determination, except to say leasing
will surely be more expensive to the Federal Government.
This "roll-over" of a long term investment is a real
possibility which further compounds the problem of
analysis
.
B. DIFFERENT ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES
In our study of TAKX it became apparent that each
entity in its presentation of the TAKX analysis would
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conveniently mix levels of analysis switching from macro-
economic positions to microeconomic arguments, to decisions
based on corporate investment strategy. The first, second,
and third order flows are a classic example. Depending
upon how one defines TAKX in the market place identifies
what costs are relevant in the subsequent analysis. No
study actually defined the environment within which TAKX
would be analyzed. Argent often presented a microeconomic
view assigning all the costs and reflows to TAKX. But
Argent would switch to macro theories in expressing how the
market would react to the entry of TAKX, without relating
how macro theories would affect the earlier defined costs
and reflows. Likewise JCT would present a micro view of
TAKX as it relates to the budget in terms of TAKX impact
but would reverse itself upon discussing TAKX's entry into
the debt markets and not redefine the position of TAKX with
respect to all of the other leveraged lease transactions
and combined impact on the budget.
To present a consistent analysis of TAKX it is
necessary to assume a single economic viewpoint. Tax
expenditures and deficit financing must somehow be
reconciled with corporate tax shelter strategies so that a
consistent view is followed in the analysis. Again the
differing levels of analysis used by each entity must
somehow be limited to one environment to facilitate the
comparison of the various studies with one another.
Ill

C. AN AREA FOR FURTHER STUDY/TAKX AS A MICROCOSM
In the interviews at Military Sealift Command and in
the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Shipbuilding and Logistics) TAKX was described by several
interviewees in terms of the immediate economic effect it
has on a severely depressed shipbuilding industry. TAKX is
responsible according to them, for virtually the only work
in three of the four shipyards with TAKX contracts and has
created over 12,000 jobs in the shipyards plus many
thousands of jobs for subcontractors and vendors around the
country. The program will create more than 750 seafaring
jobs for the U.S. Merchant Marine. The program is also
credited with the prevention of default on approximately
$100 million of government guaranteed notes on three of the
ships in the program.
Everett Pyatt, ASN (S&L) , described the TAKX program as
a "microcosm" of a larger problem of preservation of the
vital U.S. capability found in the troubled shipbuilding
industry. Does leveraged leasing provide a means to
maintain some of the threatened shipbuilding capability in
the U.S.? Does leveraged leasing equitably share the
burden of preservation of a vital industry? How does it
compare to previously used methods such as direct
subsidies, preferential and prejudicial tariffs? As
Mr. Pyatt said in his testimony before Congress,
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"Aside from the fact that we believe that a proper
analysis of the total cost to the Government shows that
chartering is less expensive than leasing, we submit that
even if that were not the case, the intent of Congress in
providing the various tax incentives has been fully
achieved in the TAKX and T-5 tanker programs." [Ref. 4]
Only through continued use will the industry be
preserved to fulfill the critical strategic role many
envision for the future. If the preservation is to be
accomplished, can leveraged leasing be considered a viable
means to equitably share the cost? The answers to these
questions can provide further insight into the future of
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